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ABSTRACT
There has been a popular trend for many governments to ponder the benefit to
privatize and deregulate the electricity industry. Among those famous cases, the
electricity privatization program in the UK stands out to be the most influential case.
Because the success of the UK privatization program has provided a model, many
governments quietly follow the step and privatize and deregulate the electricity industry.
The National Grid Company plc is one the products of the UK privatization
program. The company is a monopoly in the transmission business and responsible for the
reliability and integrity of the system. However, the company's decision may not lead to
the optimal system development.
From investors' view point, the National Grid Company gave its stockholders
stable amount of profits after the company was founded. Meanwhile NGC's track record
of technical operation is very good. The productivity per employee is growing over the
years. It seems the company's future is promising.
Based on our investigation, we found out that the UK electricity structure is
lacking a strong incentive for NGC or any outside investor to invest in the transmission
capacity. Neither the pricing mechanism nor the regulation provides a clear signal for
NGC to design a long-term investment strategy. As a result, there are no major
transmission asset's investment since 1990 except upgrading the transmission capacity
close to the border.
Therefore, we recommend that either the electricity regulation mechanism has to
be changed or OFFER needs to consider to open the transmission market for competition.
Thesis Advisor: Richard D. Tabors
Senior Research Engineer, LEES
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Chapter 1 Introduction
The investment strategy set by the electricity industry is being dramatically changed at the
moment. It is the result of the changing environment of the electricity industry.
Traditionally electric utilities like to consider the generation, transmission and distribution
sectors as a whole when they outline their investment strategy. Nowadays, the generation,
transmission, and distribution sectors have different types of problems and challenges;
therefore, utilities have to find new strategies for their investment.
The privatization of electricity is the most clear sign of the change in the market.' The
company evaluated in this thesis, the National Grid Company, is one of the products of the
UK privatization program. Argentina, New Zealand and Chile also have their privatization
programs on the way. Because many privatized utilities have shown improved
performance, many governments consider jumping on the bandwagon. For more than 10
years researchers have foreseen the effects of privatization of electricity. 3'4 The new
paradigm depicted by these researchers is gradually being implemented by many countries
in the world.5
Electricity pricing theory is the focus of the research activities.6 7 The spot pricing
mechanism for the generation sector has been developed since the 1980s by Schweppe and
Leonard S. Hyman, "Expanding Your Orbit - Privatization: The Hows and Whys", Public Utilities
Fortnightly, February 1, 1993, p. 18.
Z T. W. Berrie, "Privatization in developing countries", The Crown Agents Review, Vol. 1, 1989, p. 27-
32.
3 S. Littlechild, "Privatization principles", paper to seminar on Energy Privatization, University of
Surrey, Guildford, UK.
4 M. Beesley and S. Littlechild, "Privatization: principles, problems and priorities", Lloyds bank Review,
July 1983, pp. 7-10.
5 F. C. Schweppe, "Power Systems 2000", IEEE Spectrum, Vol. 15, No. 7, July 1978.
6 A. Hons, "An attempt at an international comparison of electricity rates, Central Electricity Generating
Board", Report by the UK Monopoly and Merger Commission, HC 315, HMSO.
7 T. W. Berrie, "mplementation of advanced tariffs", paper to Conference on the Economics of Electric
Power Systems, Electricity Tariffs and Industrial Reaction (University of New South Wales, Sydney).
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8his colleagues at MIT. Although many are still researching the detail of the pricing
mechanism in the generation sector, the main ideas of the pricing theories have already
been investigated thoroughly. Many researchers believe that using SMP (System Marginal
Price) pricing is the right way to charge for electricity generation.9 Meanwhile, the
transmission pricing mechanism is the topic most discussed and relates to different
wheeling and system quality issues.' 0°" ' The development of new technology for the
distribution sector is still on the way; therefore, discussing the competitive distribution
sector is still in its early stage.
The theory of the transmission pricing mechanism is still controversial. Two types of basic
problems for the transmission pricing are the main focus of the discussion. The first type
of problem relates to price relation of the additional power transfer between users of the
network and the owners of the transmission capacity. It relates to the issue of wheeling
practice.' 2 3 The second type of problem is associated with all the power exchange taking
place in the power system and reflects how to design the investment strategy and set the
utility rate.
Many governments have begun to privatize the public utilities because the success of the
UK privatization program has provided a model. When Ms. Margaret Thatcher was still
the Prime Minister of the British government, she privatized the telecommunications, gas,
8 F. C. Schweppe, M. C. Caramanies, R. D. Tabors, and R. E. Bohn, Spot Pricing of Electricity, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1988.
9 SMP pricing is the base of the free market competition. Many authors in the area have started their
presumption on the issue. Fundamentally the electricity industry was always treated as a natural
monopoly. However, many scholars examined the situation and found the possibility of competition.
Under strong competition, SMP would be a primary candidate for charging consumers. Therefore, the
issue was a popular consents in the field.
"' R. D. Tabors, "Transmission System Management and Pricing: New Paradigms and International
comparisons", IEEEIPES 1993 Winter Meeting, Columbus, OH, Jan. 1993.
" N. S. Rau, "Certain Considerations in the Pricing of Transmission Service", IEEE 1989 PES Winter
Meeting, paper 89 WM 184-3 PWRS.
12 K. Kelly, J. S. Henderson, and P. A. Nagler, "Some Economic Principles for Pricing Wheeled Power",
National Regulatory Research Institute, NRRi 87-7, August 1987.
13 F. C. Schweppe, R. E. Bohn, M. C. Caramanis, "Wheeling Rates: An Economic-Engineering
Foundation", MIT LEES Technical Report, TR85-005, 1985.
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public housing, electricity, and water industries. The privatization of electricity was the
largest of the privatization efforts shown by the UK government. There are two key
elements of the UK privatization program. One is the 'RPI-X' method 4 of price control
and the other is the regulation mechanism to promote effective competition. 5
The UK's privatization effort gave birth to the National Grid Company, the main focus of
the thesis. In the UK's privatization process, the National Grid Company was organized
to provide for power systems control and much of the financial management (settlements)
included in the old Central Electric Generating Board (CEGB). Because the generation
sector is opened for competition, the National Grid Company, which controls the
electricity dispatch, has a peculiar role in maintaining system's service and quality. To
some extent, the development of the National Grid Company is shaping the future of the
UK's electricity industry. To promote the future development of the UK's electricity
sector, NGC needs to provide a clear signal on how the transmission infrastructure will be
developed. This thesis focuses on how NGC builds its investment strategy and how
NGC's decisions impact the system.
NGC has carefully designed its investment strategy since it was founded. The
performance of the transmission business operation is very smooth and efficient. The
productivity of NGC and the reliability of electric service has improved since vesting on
April 1, 1990. Its financial performance is promising. Without any doubt, the prospect of
its stock offering on the market is bright.
Neither the pricing mechanism nor the regulation provide a clear signal for NGC to design
its long-term investment strategy. Although it invested in some equipment that connects
to new generation capacity, no large scale transmission investment have been made. It is
possible that both regulators and NGC want more investors to build their generation
1 4 J. Kay, C. Mayer and D. Thompson, eds., 1986, Privatization and regulation - the UK experience,
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
15 John Vickers and George Yarrow, "Privatization and Regulation: Regulation of Privatized Firms in
Britain", European Economic Review, Vol. 32, 1988, p. 465.
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capacity closer to the load center in the south, therefore reinforcing the transmission
capacity from north to south is not an emergent issue.
This thesis provides an evaluation of NGC's investment strategies and performance.
Also, the pricing signal for electricity transmission is analyzed. A list of the incentives of
transmission capacity investment is depicted. Finally, we present the conclusion of this
thesis.
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Chapter 2 The UK Electricity System Overview
Introduction
The UK's electricity sector has undergone several major changes since the end of W.W.II.
These changes were based on the reflection of the government's belief and economic
trends. Private companies owned the majority of generation capacities in the early years.
After many years of experience, the UK government decided to absorb the private
companies into a public electricity entity. At that time, there were no nuclear power plants
and gas combined cycle turbine generators but only thermal (primarily coal fired) and
hydro plants scattered around the UK.
During 1990/91, the British government privatized the electricity industry. After
privatizing the electricity industry, the major players in the generation market, were the
National Power Company and the PowerGen. Moreover, these two companies have
become international electricity development project investors and consultants as they sell
their operating experience in the international market. 16 Meanwhile, the only transmission
company, the National Grid Company, is rated very high in the money market. 7 Because
NGC has a central role in the electricity sector, it has a strong influence on the future
development of the UK's electricity industry.
Infrastructure In The Past
Before the Electricity (Supply) Act in 1919 was passed by the British government, the
electricity industry was composed of municipal electricity companies and commercial
utilities.18 These companies were constrained in their service regions and heavily
16 National Power and PowerGen's performance is discussed in Appendix A and B.
17 Although NGC does not have stock offering in the market, it did float loan and debt to raise capital.
Over the years, its loan and debt were rated at the highest rating in the market.
18 John Vickers and George Yarrow, PRIVATIZATION: An Economic Analysis, MIT Press Series on the
Regulation of Economic Activity, The MIT Press, 1991, p. 282.
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regulated by local governments. However, the private ownership was more common in
the distribution side and public ownership was common in the generation side.
The nationalization of the electricity sector was gradually accomplished through major
steps taken by the British government. The Electricity (Supply) Act in 1919 established
the Electricity Commission to promote, regulate, and supervise the supply of electricity on
a national scale. Then the Electricity (Supply) Act in 1926 created the Central electricity
Board to manage and invest in a national electricity system. In 1947 the Electricity Act
completed the nationalization of the electricity industry by establishing the Central
Electricity Authority (CEA) as a public corporation responsible for the generation and
supply of bulk electricity and created fourteen Area Boards. Each Area Board constituted
a separate public corporation responsible for the distribution of electricity in its region.
In 1957, the Herbert committee recommended that the British government separate the
functions of generation and supply of bulk electricity from the distribution functions.'9 As
a result, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) was established as the central
control agency of generation and bulk power supply. The CEGB was directly responsible
for meeting the requirement set by the Secretary of State for Energy. At the same time,
the government gave a greater autonomy to the Area Boards. The overall picture of the
electricity sector in England and Wales is shown in Figure 1.
13
' Ibid, p. 283.
CEGB
Figure 1: Electricity Industry before Vesting - EdF is the Electricity de France, SSEB is the
Scottish Electricity Board, and NOSHEB is the North Shore Electricity Board.
The British government reduced the generating market barrier for new entrants by way of
passing the Energy Act in 1983 to encourage competition.20 The legislation required the
CEGB to publish the tariff for independent electricity producers and make the Area
Boards buy certain amount of electricity outside CEGB in a published tariff known as the
Private Purchase Tariffs.
In 1990, the privatization of the CEGB created private generating companies including
National Power and the PowerGen, one government utility, Nuclear Electric, and National
Grid to whom the license of transmission was awarded. National Grid Company inherited
all the transmission capital and hydro generation capacity from the CEGB. The 12 area
boards were privatized at the same time. The present electricity industry structure is
shown in Figure 2.
14
2 Ibid, p. 285.
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Figure 2: Electricity Industry after Vesting: Illustrating customer relationships - EdF
is the Electricity de France, IG is the independent generator, SP is the Scottish Power, NE is the
Nuclear Electricity, NP is the National Power and PG is the PowerGen.
Current Demand and Supply Condition In UK
Since privatization there has been little if any annual increase in demand. In 1992 there
was a decrease of 0.6%. At that time, total generation capacity has dropped below the
1990 level by 1.3%. The description of the electricity industry in 1990 an 1991 is listed in
Table 1.
15
Table 1: The Generation Capacity before the Vesting in UK21
Plant capacity (MW)
Major power producers
Total declared net capacity
Conventional steam stations:
Coal fired
Oil fired
Mixed or dual fired
Gas fired
Combined cycle gas turbine stations
Nuclear stations
Gas turbines and oil engines
Hydro-electric stations:
Natural flow
Pumped storage
Renewable other than hydro
Other generators
Total capacity of own generating plant
Conventional steam stations
Combined cycle gas turbine stations
Nuclear stations
Hydro-electric stations (natural flow)
Renewable other than hydro
All generating companies
Total capacity
Conventional steam stations
Combined cycle gas turbine stations
Nuclear stations
Gas turbines and oil engines
Hydro-electric stations:
Natural flow
Pumped storage
Renewable other than hydro
1990 1991
70327
34583
12487
5434
0
0
10373
3356
1306
2787
1
69320
34298
11895
5172
0
0
10733
3130
1302
2787
3
4230
3208
76
710
101
135
4198
3279
76
620
101
122
74557 73518
55712 54644
76 76
11083 11353
3356 3130
1407 1403
2787 2787
136 125
In the privatization process the National Power Company and the PowerGen Company
inherited all the thermal generating capacities except for the nuclear power plants from
CEGB. These nuclear power plants are managed by an independent public company, the
21 The British Energy Digest 1993, p. 109.
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National Nuclear. The structures of the National Power and the PowerGen are listed in
Appendix A and B.
Because the UK was still in the economic recession after 1990, the growth of the UK's
electricity demand was not clear as shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Electricity Generated and Supplied in UK between 1989 and 1993.
GWh 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989
Total electricity generated 323,030 320,961 322,811 319,701 314,585
Electricity generation growth 0.6% -0.6% 1.0% 1.6%
rate
Total electricity supplied (net) 301,793 298,469 300,590 297,465 291,751
Electricity supplied growth rate 1.1% -0.7% 1.0% 2.0%
OmIUUU 
32uuuu.
310000
300000
290000
280000
270000
* Total electricity generated
* Total electricity suppled
(net)
*
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Figure 3: Electricity generated and supplied in UK
At the moment, the amount of total generating capacity is more than the UK needs;
therefore, the National Power and the PowerGen are retiring inefficient power plants.
Their effort did not really pay off because these power plants which were being
decommissioned were rarely being dispatched by NGC except for some old power plants
in the south. The bidding prices of these plants were too high to be called into the
economic dispatch.
17
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Due to the limited information we can get, the England and Wales' power demand can not
be derived from the numbers in Table 2. However, we used these numbers from the
PowerGen's Annual Report to derive the electricity being supplied in Table 3.22
Table 3: Electricity Supplied in England and Wales
GWh 1994 1993 1992 1991
Electricity supplied 269,230 274,070 267,860 271,430
Growth rate -1.8% 2.32% -1.3%
If the UK's economy keeps the same trend as it has in previous years, then we may
estimate that the growth of demand of electricity will be in the 1% range. We need to
bear in mind that the amount of generating capacity is still much more than the consumers
need.
310000
300000
290000
280000
270000
260000
250000
UTotal Electricity Supplied
(net) In UK
* Total Electricity Supplied
(net) In England and Wales
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Figure 4: Electricity Supplied in UK
22 Because the statistic provided by UK government has the whole country's electricity demand and supply
together, it is very hard to figure out the electricity used in England and Wales. However, PowerGen's
Annual Reports did report their total sale of electricity and its percentage with respect to the overall
consumption in England and Wales. As a result, we can derive England and Wales' demand.
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Chapter 3 National Grid Company's Technical Performance
Introduction
When UK started its electricity industry privatization, they considered that the
transmission sector inevitably was a natural monopoly. Therefore, they decided to
establish a company, the National Grid Company, that is responsible for the transmission
business. "It was charged under the Electricity Act with the duty of running an efficient
and economical system and to facilitate competition in generation and supply. In addition,
it is intended that NGC be neutral, in the sense that it is not allowed to trade any
energy."23 Not only did the National Grid Company inherit all the transmission assets that
operated in the range between 275kV and 400kV, but it also inherited two pumped
storage facilities that are important in balancing the system.
NGC's Transmission Assets
The total transmission assets owned by NGC is significant. Its 400/275kV system in
England and Wales consists of over 7,000 route kilometers of overhead transmission line,
on 21,600 towers, 500 kilometers of underground cable, and 280 substations.24 Although
the transmission system has a very high investment cost, most of the equipment has a very
long lifetime and almost no marginal cost when in use. NGC lists transmission assets as a
long lifetime investment in its annual report accounting policy.2 5
23 Steve Anderson, "The U.K. Electricity Market," Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Special Seminar on
the U.K. Electricity Market, September 16, 1993.
24 The National Grid Company plc, Annual Report and Accounts, 1992/93, p. 6.
25 The National Grid Company plc, Annual Report and Accounts, 1993/94, p. 29.
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Table 4: The Tangible Fixed Assets Lifetime for NGC.
Plant and machinery Years
Transmission plant
Towers 60
Substation plant, overhead lines and cables 40
Protection, control and communication equipment 25
Cross-Channel Link 25
Pumped storage
Civil engineering works 80
Other plant 40
Freehold and leasehold properties Up to 40
Motor vehicles and office equipment 5
Because the lifetime of the transmission assets is very long, NGC's investment strategy is
much different from many high tech firms' in the market. If NGC borrows the money
from the market, it could have much longer time to pay back the loan. On the other hand,
NGC has a hard time figuring out how to earn back its investment. It seems there is no
clear reward for NGC's transmission capacity investment. We will come back to this
point later.
NGC's Pumped Storage Units
The National Grid Company was awarded two Pumped-storage units from the CEGB.
The company uses these two units to maintain the system balance and for some other
operating reasons. The larger unit with 1728 MW capacity is in Dinorwig and the smaller
one with 360 MW capacity is in Ffestiniog.
Performance of NGC's Transmission Operation
The customer base of NGC is large including 54 directly connected generating stations
with more than 57,000MW capacity, 12 Regional Electricity Companies, and 8 directly
connected industrial electricity consumers at 14 sites, as well as 1,670 second-tier supply
20
arrangements.2 6 In a sense, it acts as the New York Stock Exchange Board. It sets up the
environment to let many companies negotiate in the market. Moreover, its customers
have no alternatives because it is the single, natural monopoly.
Although NGC has the advantage of being a monopoly, it also bears important
responsibilities to develop the infrastructure. NGC is required to maintain the system
integrity and security. If NGC does not provide good service, OFFER (Office Of
Electricity Regulation) may choose to revoke NGC's transmission license. Measures of
the system integrity and security can be seen through many indicators like events of
frequency deviation and the reliability of the system.
From 1991 to 1994, there was only one incident of voltage deviation. In June 1992 a fault
that occurred at NGC's Lackenby substation on Teesside triggered a voltage deviation
outside statutory and license criteria. The event caused the company to revise its
operational instruction in order to prevent similar events.27 Reactive power output has not
been a big problem in the system. Because the system still has some operating margin for
reactive power flow, the reactive power is only calculated for the Uplift.28 However,
many people still perceive it will be a problem in the future.
Meanwhile, the frequency deviation caused several incidents in the system operation from
1991 to 1994. On September 13, 1991, a generating power plant failure caused the loss
of the full 2,000 MW Cross-Channel Link. Consequently the system frequency in England
and Wales briefly dropped below the statutory lower limit.29 From 1992 to 1993, there
were four events of frequency deviations due to the tripping of one bipole of the cross-
channel link with France. 30 Although the frequency deviations were eliminated in five
2 6 The National Grid Company plc, Annual Report and Accounts, 1992/93, p. 6.
2 7 Ibid, p. 11.
28 Uplift is the cost combination among the integrity and quality components of the electricity supply.
29 The National Grid Company plc, Annual Report, 1991/92, p. 13.
30The National Grid Company plc, Annual Report and Accounts, 1992/93, p. 11.
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minutes in each incident, the close-tie relation between the French power system and the
UK's system is still apparent. This condition will be examined in the next few chapters.
The system reliability has been maintained by the National Grid Company to a very good
level. In Table 5, the result of system reliability proved its claims.
Table 5: System Reliability in England and Wales
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94
Reliability 99.9999% 99.9997% 99.9998%
Lost-time accidents 72 56
Incidents of loss of supply 9 9 8
Accident frequency rate per 100,000 hours 0.78 0.62
The frequency of lost-time accident and loss of supply was reduced over these years.
Since the load was flat and obsolete plants were being decommissioned, the clear
indication is that National Grid Company has reorganized its operating and maintenance
structure to help upgrade the system performance. Moreover, RPI-X formula also
encourages this company to have more efficient operation.
Two major events of loss supply happened in 1992 and 1993. In September 1992 a failure
at Bolney substation that caused supplies to be lost in the mid-Sussex area.3 ' In December
13, 1993, when two supergrid transformers tripped with the third transformer at the site
out of service for maintenance, 270MW of demand on the transmission system was lost.
The event affected approximately 230,000 Manweb customers.32
From 1991 to 1994, the system demand did not increase very much. In Table 6, the
maximum demand in the system has been fluctuating in recent years. This situation will
deteriorate NGC's ability to forecast future system development.
31 Ibid, p. 11.
32 The National Grid Company plc, Annual Report and Accounts, 1993/94, p. 10.
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Table 6: Maximum system demand in UK.
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94
Maximum demand 47,665 MW 44,867 MW 47,740 MW
Maximum peak demand measured at power 48,100 MW 47,925 MW 48,100 MW
station boundaries
System Development In The Past
In recent years, many investors continued to apply for new generation licenses. In
1991/92, twenty-one applications with a 11,942MW of new generating capacity went to
NGC. By 31 March 1992, the total additional new generating capacity was 20,500MW.33
In 1992/93 3,400 MW of new generating capacity was connected. Moreover, the total
amounts of new generating capacity was up to 25,000MW by March 1993.34 Fortunately
the National Power and PowerGen also retired many old, inefficient plants to reduce their
cost. The total capacity closed by the National Power Company before 1994 was
9000MW 35 and the capacity closed by PowerGen was 1900MW.3 6
Electricity Imports From Other Countries and Regions
In addition to the new capacity, the National Grid Company imports much power from
Scotland and France. It is very easy for NGC to import electricity from Scotland because
they are closely connected. Table 7 shows the heavy interaction with Scotland Electricity
sector since 1991.37 It is interesting to note that the utilization rate of Scotland electricity
has dropped for one to two years. However, the imports of electricity from Scotland did
not change much in these years. We will present a possible explanation that NGC decided
to use more electricity from the south instead of transmitting power on the longer line
from the north.
3 Ibid, p. 13.
34 The National Grid Company plc, Annual Report and Accounts, 1992/93, p. 12.
35 Data from the Annual Report and Accounts for National Power in 1992, 1993, and 1994.
36 Data from the Annual Report and Accounts for PowerGen in 1992 and 1993.
37 Data from NGC's Annual Reports and Accounts for 1991/92, 1992/93 and 1993/94.
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Table 7: Electricity Transactions with Scotland
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94
Availability 91.2% 98.2% 98.9%
Utilization rate 94.4% 86.3% 85.3%
Imported electricity 6.18 TWh 6.3TWh 6.28TWh
Exported electricity 2.4GWh 0 1.3GWh
NGC also tried to improve and upgrade the transmission between Scotland and the
system. It increased the rating of the existing transmission line from the border with
Scotland to Harker, near Carlisle. NGC maintained the quality of the transmission by way
of upgrading the substations on the transmission lines. NGC hoped to have an
interconnection with Scotland up to 1,600MW.3 8 However, NGC still needs to upgrade
its transmission capacity in order to fully utilize the connection. "Although scope now
exists for power transfers above 850MW, the extent to which these can be achieved in
practice depends on system conditions. Full availability of the uprating will not be
established until completion of associated reinforcements to the transmission system
preparation for which are in handfollowing the decision in principle to grant consent for
new transmission lines in North Yorkshire. "39
The Cross-Channel Link with France is more important with respect to its transmission
capacity, geographical implication and the utilization rates. Although some people had
contended that the UK should not have imported so much electricity from France, NGC
still obtains the consent from OFFER to allow more import. "Following the
Government's accouncement in March 1993 that use of the Cross-Channel Link would
not be restricted, NGC has concluded a new 8-year agreement with Electricite de France
covering the full 2,000MW capacity of the link." 40 Table 8 listed NGC's transaction with
France since 1991.41
38 The National Grid Company, Annual Report, 1991/92, p. 18.
39The National Grid Company plc, Annual Report and Accounts, 1993/94, p. 16.
40The National Grid Company plc, Annual Report and Accounts, 1992/93, p. 19.
41 Data from NGC's Annual Reports and Accounts for 1991/92, 1992/93 and 1993/94.
24
Table 8: Utilization of the Cross-Channel Link with France.
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94
Availability 95.8% 97.1% 96.6%
Utilization rate 98.2% 99.4% 99.9%
Imported electricity 16.3 TWh 16.7TWh 16.78TWh
Exported electricity 0 0 0
There is a clear trend for NGC to import more electricity from EdF so any accident
happening to the Cross-Link causes system problems. There were several incidents in the
system from 1991 to 1994 related to the connection with France but NGC still intended to
utilize the connection heavily. One possible reason is that the link is connected to the
southern region of UK and the region requires a lot of electricity with a limited amount of
generating capacity. Therefore, importing electricity from France seems to be a
reasonable solution for system balance. Moreover, EdF's SMP is always less than UK's
SMP so NGC the electricity distributors like to purchase from EdF. The scenario can be
supported by the reducing utilization rate of the connection with Scotland. It is also
possible that Scotland's SMP is more than France's SMP. The matter will be investigated
in the next few chapters.
* Utilization rate of
Scotland connectiobn
* Utilizatbon rate of France
connection
95,00°~
90.00%,
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Figure 5: Comparison of Utilization Rate of Scotland and France connections.
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Figure 6: Comparison of Exported Electricity from Scotland and France.
Utilization of Transmission Capacity
So far, the increase of the utilization rate of the transmission capacity is not noticeable due
to the drop of consumption in 1992. Because we did not get any data about the utilization
rate of 1991/92 from NGC's 1991/92 Annual Reports and Accounts, we only list the
number from 1992 to 1994.
Table 9: Energy Transfer in The UK System.
1992/93 1993/94
Total energy transported 262.6 TWh 266.5TWh
Total energy transported on a weather corrected base 264.8 TWh 267.6 TWh
On the other hand, the availability of the transmission system has increased since 1991.
Table 10: Availability o
Average availability
Winter peak availability
f NGC's Transmission
1991/92 1992/93
90.9% 92.9%
97.5% 97.7%
After the UK government privatized the electricity industry, companies trade electricity
through a pool that is moderated by NGC. Total energy traded in 1990/91 was 268.0
TWh. 1991/92's figure is 268.7TWh that is marginally more than 1990/91. However, the
figure dropped back to 267.0TWh in 1993/94. Although there could be some potential
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benefit to allow trading electricity outside the pool, the benefit may not be more than the
cost used to support the trading. OFFER believed it was not wise to permit widespread
trading outside the pool.42
If we combine the points including trading with EdF and Scotland, system quality as well
as trading in and outside the Pool, we will be able to envision about the future
development trend of the electricity sector. We will be back to this picture in Chapter 7.
NGC's DSM (Demand Side Management) Program and Pumped Storage
Business
Meanwhile NGC's DSM program maintained mild progress since 1990. It can be seen in
Table 11. NGC is probably the best candidate in the market to promote DSM programs
because it oversees the system operation and understands where it is needed to reduce the
load. At the moment, NGC only sells its DSM program to big wholesale customers due to
the cost of the DSM program. It is possible that the role played by NGC in the market has
somewhat constrained NGC's ability to aggressively look for DSM opportunities but it
can be changed by way of modifying the regulation of the DSM program.
Table 11: The Reduction Of The DSM Program by NGC.
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94
The Reduction through DSM Program 500MW 1,100MW 950MW
The pumped storage plants operated by NGC played an important role in NGC's
operation. From 1991 to 1994 these two pumped storage units maintained the balance of
the system.4 3 It is interesting to see that the utilization of these two units dropped over
time. However, these units are still generating or are in reserve most of the year. It may
increase the Uplift component in the pool clearing price if NGC generates more electricity
from these two units. The pumped storage plants are used to support the system
frequency most of the time.
42 OFFER, "Report On Trading Outside The Pool, July 1994", p. iv.
43 Ibid.
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Table 12: Pumped Storage Unit Operation of NGC.
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94
Dinorwig output 1013 GWh 1202 GWh 938GWh
Dinorwig availability 95% 92.6% 92%
Ffestiniog output 142 GWh 146 GWh 88 GWh
Ffestiniog availability 86% 91.2% 84%
NGC's Asset Investment
There were two major approaches to upgrade the transmission capital over the years. One
was the construction of new transmission capital and the reinforcement of the existing
transmission capital, and the other was the Five Centre Project that will be described later.
We list the major projects done by NGC for the first approach.
* Using quadrature boosters at 400kV transmission lines. The devices control the flow
of electricity on the system and can help defer the need for expensive system
reinforcement. 44
· Building a new transmission line between Lackenby and Cleveland Shipton in
Yorkshire.
· Developing new 400kV substations at Lackenby, Norton and Thornton.
· Reconstructing the existing overhead transmission line between Norton and Slatholme.
· Constructing a new 400kV substation and associated overhead transmission lines at
Killingholme.
· Constructing two new transformers at NGC's Sellingdge substation in Kent to provide
electricity supplies for the Channel Tunnel.
* Uprating from 275kV to 400kV of the existing transmission line from the border with
Scotland to Harker, near Carlisle.
· Building new substations at Rassau and Cardiff East in South Wales, Botley wood
near Southampton and Staythorpe in Nottinghamshire.
• Replacing 390 route kilometers of overhead transmission line and 17.4 kilometers of
underground cable in 1992.
· Replacing 200 route kilometers of overhead transmission line, 37 circuit breakers and
three transformers in 1993.
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44 Ibid.
The second approach is the Five Centre Control project. NGC has tried to streamline its
operation of the system by way of combining old control centers into fewer control
centers in the system to oversee the performance. The total number of control centers
dropped from seven to five. As a result the security and reliability of electricity suppliers
can be ensured. In the meantime, a new Energy Management System was installed to
achieve real time operation.
NGC is also investigating building two more connection links with two other countries.
"Following confirmation of the technical feasibility of a new 600MW interconnection
between Ireland and Wales, a decision on the project has been deferred until the
completion of further economic and financing appraisals by the Electricity Supply Board
of Ireland and wider consideration by the Irish Government." 45 Also, a desk-top study
to investigate the possible connection between the UK and the Norwegian transmission
utility is finished.
In addition to its primary business, NGC also invests in the telecommunication industry
through its subsidy named ENERGIS Communications Limited. A fully developed fiber-
optic network has been built with its existing electricity network. Since it is not in the
main focus of the thesis and the result is still unclear, this will be a background issue.
45 The National Grid Company plc, Annual Report and Accounts, 1992/93, p. 17.
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Chapter 4 National Grid Company's Financial Performance
Expected Profit and Cost Of Capital for NGC Before Vesting
The profitability of the National Grid Company was one concerns for the privatization
program. When the British government privatized the electricity industry, people
suspected that NGC was going to be profitable. It was very difficult to forecast NGC's
financial future without having any similar company in the world. NGC's 1990 Business
Plan expected a slowly declining rate of the real cost of new long-term debt (to drop from
8% in 1991 to 6% in 1994).46 Meanwhile, NGC anticipated a steady 3% of dividends'
growth rate. "The costs of equity finance comprises the required dividend yield of 8%,
plus a minimum dividend growth factor of 3%, totaling 11%. The 3% dividend growth
factor represents the rate at which NGC's dividends are projected to grow in real terms
in NGC's Business Plan." 47 Therefore, NGC should have maintained its operation by
securing a certain amount of return for 6-6.5% for debt finance and 11-12% for equity
finance.
Cooper & Lybrand Deloitte recommended that NGC should stick to 35% of the ratio of
debt to total financing. On the other hand, equity financing will play the major role of the
total financing. "In order to achieve a conservative cost of capital estimate, therefore, we
have assumed weights of 35:65 debt to equity in line with the market value of gearing. ,,48
As a result, the estimated average cost of capital for NGC is around 9-10%. However,
CLD's estimation was not used in the operation by the management. This can be seen
from NGC's accounting reports from recent years. We will come back to this point later.
However, the debt to equity ratio was not the only indicator concentrated on by investors.
NGC's risk factor, beta, that is very important for investors is different from the risk
4 6 Cooper & Lybrand Deloitte, "NGC's Required Rate of Return On New Connection ", August 1990, p. 1.
47 Ibid.
4 8 Ibid.
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factors for most companies in the stock market. Considering the information before 1990,
NGC has a beta that is smaller than 1. It means that NGC's return will not closely vary
with the market fluctuation. Because NGC's product is not closely related to the whole
economy, the financial performance of NGC is only somewhat influenced by the market
trend.
Also, Cooper & Lybrand Deloitte (CLD) anticipated a reverse trend of NGC's profit.
"The regulatory regime imposed on NGC will tend to dampened down the profit
performance and lower beta; as a monopoly it will produce profits during recessions;
however, when the economy has a growth phase the price-capping formula will mean
that, unlike, for example, TV companies it will not become very profitable." 49 However,
CLD presented a somewhat contradicted beta description. "The lack of a direct
competitor will tend to lower beta; although there is competition from other fuel
transmission networks, there is unlikely to be major competitive pressure on margins
during recessions; NGC's high ratio of fixed costs will tend to raise beta; some 40% of
NGC's total costs are countedfor by CCA depreciation charges and rates." 50
If we use a Capital Asset Pricing Model as the base to deduce the suitable required normal
return on project, we can use the following equation to calculate it.
Equation 1: Rate of Return
(I1- PT) * RE * eROR= - IPT)*E*e d(I - CT)
Where
ROR = Required normal return on project
RE = Nominal return on equity
CT = Rate of corporation tax
PT = Personal tax rate
I = Nominal interest rate
e = Share of equity
d = Share of debt
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4 9 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
Moreover, Shareholders' required return can be expressed as
Equation 2: Shareholders' required return
re = rf + D * (market premium)
Where
re = Real return on the share
rf = Real return on risk-free investment
[3 = a measure of the variability of the return on the share compared to the
equity market as a whole
market premium = the risk premium required for equity over the return on risk-
free investment
The London Business School estimated a long run return to equity based on the historical
data and got a number of 7-10% in real terms. However, NGC's performance is better
than this estimation. The market risk premium is in the range of 6-9%. In 1990, the real
risk free rates were in the range of 3.5%-4.5% as given by the rate on medium term index
linked government stocks. CLD also estimated that the equity beta value is around 0.6 to
0.8. Meanwhile, the tax rate for NGC is around 35%. Also, the NGC Business Plan
assumed an average nominal interest rate on new debt of approximately 12%.
NGC's Management Strategies
It is not easy for NGC to follow any historical precedents. NGC, unlike its cousins,
National Power and PowerGen, has some transmission companies in the world to compare
with. NGC is still awarded special monopoly power for many reasons. Because NGC's
business characters are very different from the National Power and the PowerGen's,
NGC's management strategy may show a large difference from the strategies of other
utility companies in the UK. To draw a comparison, we like to list the management
strategies chosen by the National Power and the PowerGen. In Appendix A and B, we
discuss the investment strategy set by the National Power and the PowerGen in detail.
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The management in the National Power and the PowerGen have the following similar
decisions.
* Reduce the fuel inventory turnover rate.
* Close old and inefficient generating plants.
* Decrease the number of employees.
* Invest on the CCGT (Combined Cycle Gas Turbine) Technology.
* Use the cash in hand to invest on other business.
* Steady increase of net income margin.
* Steady increase of returns on investment, equity and assets.
* Reduce the total asset turnover rate over the year.
* Maintain a low debt to equity ratio.
* Operate under a low rate of total debt to total capital.
Because NGC is constrained by OFFER in its ability to invest on new generation plants,
NGC cannot invest on the CCGT technology. In the meantime, NGC does not own any
old coal or oil thermal plants so it needs not worry about generation efficiency. On the
other hand, NGC still tries to reduce its work force and increase its productivity. The
intention is that, in order to obtain a better response from the stock market when a
company is privatized, NGC does not want to let the stockholder know that they have to
bear the burden of excess personnel costs.
Table 13: NGC's Employee Information.5'
Payroll costs and employees 1994 1993 1992 1991
____ _ .m(£) m(£) m(£) m(£) ()
Payroll costs
Wages and salaries 139.6 147.5 149.7 138.3
Social security costs 12.5 12.1 11.9 10.9
Other pension costs 19.1 20.6 22.9 32.9
Severance costs 51.2 39 32.3
Subtotal 222.4 219.2 216.8 182.1
Less amounts capitalized -27.2 -25 -16.8 -17
Total 195.2 194.2 200 165.1
Average number of person
Employed by the group 5127 5666 6217 6550
Rate of decrease 9.5% 8.86% 5.08%
5' Data from NGC's Annual Reports and Accounts for 1991/92, 1992/93 and 1993/94.
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Apparently NGC has already aggressively pursued this avenue. The result can be further
proved by the number of the productivity that is increased by 64% since 1991. In Table
14 we list the result of NGC's productivity.
Table 14: NGC's Employee Productivity.
1994 1993 1992 1991
Turnover (mf) 1425 1391.8 1319.9 1144.3
Employee number 5127 5666 6217 6550
Turnover per employee (mE) 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.17
Rate of increase 12% 19% 23%
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
1
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Figure 7: The trend of Employee Productivity.
The employee productivity increased over the years but the margin for increase seems to
approaching its end. More employee lay-offs may not clearly reflect its effect on NGC's
performance any longer.
NGC's Balance Sheets and Profit And Loss Accounts
NGC's financial performance in the recent years was better than the expectation before
Vesting. If we check NGC's Profit and Loss Account in Table 15, we clearly see a
potential growth of its practice. First of all, the turnover steadily increases.
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Figure 8: NGC's Turnover, Operating Costs and Retained Profit.
Table 15: NGC's Group Historical Profit and Loss Account.
1994 1993 1992 1991
mE mf m m
Turnover 1425 1391.8 1319.9 1144.3
Operating costs -794.5 -799 -761.1 -679.6
Historical cost operating profit 630.5 592.8 558.8 464.7
Earning before interest and tax (EBIT) 1261 1185.6 1117.6 929.4
Net interest -51 -59.6 -60.9 -79
Historical cost profit on ordinary activities 579.5 533.2 497.9 385.7
before taxation
Taxation -139.7 -151.9 -163.2 -126.2
Historical cost profit on ordinary activities after 439.8 381.3 334.7 259.5
taxation
Dividends -149.1 -129.3 -117 -104.5
Retained profit 290.7 252 217.7 155
Figure 8 shows that NGC has a steady growth in turnover and retained profit but a stable
operating cost. The result proves that NGC's strategy did provide a profitable revenue for
its stockholders. Although NGC's strategies are a profitable way to manage, there is no
guarantee that the infrastructure is developed in the optimal way.
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Table 16: NGC's group Historical Balance Sheet.
1994 1993 1992 1991
mtE mf m E mE
Fixed assets
Tangible assets 2652.3 2433.3 2195.3 1926.1
Investment 12.2
Total fixed assets 2664.5 2433.3 2195.3 1926.1
Current assets
Stocks 8.1 4.9 3.4 2.7
Debtors 145.4 120.5 115 106.7
Investments 121.3 39.1 44.9
Cash and deposit 368.7 510.6 227.3 264.9
Total current assets 643.5 636 384.8 418.9
Total assets 3308 3069.3 2580.1 2345
Creditors (amounts falling due within one year) -808.7 -896.3 -705.7 -618.6
Net current liabilities -165.2 -260.3 -320.9 -199.7
Total fixed assets less current liabilities 2499.4 2173 1874.4 934.7
Creditors (amounts falling due after more than -650 -650 -600 -750
one year)
Provisions for liabilities and charges -154.2 -118.6 -122 -41.7
Net assets employed 1695.1 1404.4 1152.4 934.7
Capital and reserves
Called up share capital 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Profit and loss account 1695.1 1404.3 1152.3 934.6
Total 1695.2 1404.4 1152.4 934.7
After we check NGC's balance sheet, we discover NGC has a tremendous amount of cash
in hand. Its current assets occupy a large part of the total assets. Basically it reflects the
company's characteristic. Because NGC is an electricity company, it will obtain much
cash through transactions with its customers. NGC could also use the cash to invest in its
tangible assets. In fact, NGC is starting to use its cash in investments. In 1994, 121.3 m
£ is used for the investment payment.
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Figure 9: NGC's Assets.
Meanwhile, the net assets used have experienced a steady increase. The growth rate since
1991 is 81.35%. Also, NGC did not recruit much funding from the market because it
earned sufficient cash to support their investments.
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Table 17: NGC's Group Cash Flow Statement.
1994 1993 1992 1991
m£ m f m £ m 
Net cash inflow from operating activities 796.5 729.3 736.9 575.5
Returns on investments and servicing of financing
Interest received 35.8 34.7 34.2 48.8
Interest paid -81.3 -100 -95.9 -129.5
Dividend received from fixed assets investment 0.6
Dividends paid -133.6 -121 -107.7 -34.8
Net cash outflow from returns on investments and -178.2 -186.3 -169.4 -115.5
servicing of finance
Taxation
Corporation tax paid -145.1 -117.6 -144.6 -119.7
Purchase of certificate of tax deposit -18 -17 -19
Tax paid -163.1 -134.6 -163.6 -119.7
Investing activities
Acquisition of current asset investments and -878.1 -541.9 -191 -383.5
deposits
Disposal of current asset investments and 812.2 438.9 161.5 240.6
deposits
Payments to acquire fixed asset investment -12.6
Payments to acquire tangible fixed assets -344.9 -419.8 -317 -244.9
Receipts of capital contribution 1.2 37.5
Receipts from disposals of tangible fixed assets 2.9 1.1 2 7.1
Net cash outflow from investing activities -419.3 -484.2 -344.5 -380.7
Net cash inflow (outflow) before financing 35.9 -75.8 59.4 -40.4
Financing
Issue of 7.375% bonds 200
Repayment of debenture tranche -150 -151
New bank loan 12.8
Receipt of final installment on issued shares 0.1
Net cash (outflow) inflow from financing -137.2 200 -151 0.1
Decrease in cash and cash equivalents -101.3 124.2 -91.6 -40.3
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Financial Indicators of NGC's Performance
From the data in Table 15, Table 16 and Table 17 we can derive many financial indicators
and ratios to examine NGC's performance. In order to do a reasonable comparison, we
use the combined information for major US Investor-Owned Electric Utilities as the
reference.
Although these indicators may represent the general characteristics of a privately owned
utility, NGC is still much different from any investor-owned utility in the US.
Nevertheless, the comparison can be made with the difference in mind.
Table 18: Composite Financial Indicators for Major U.S. Investor-Owned Electric
Utilities, 1988-1992.52
Ratios 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
Activity
Electric Fixed Asset (Net Plant) Turnover 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.43
Total Asset Turnover 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.35
Total Utility Operating Revenus Plus Other 37.2 38.2 37.1 37.0 36.2
Income as a Percent of Total Assets &
Other Debts
Leverage
Debt ratio (%) 48.9 49.3 49.3 48.8 48.7
Debt-equity ratio (%) 95.7 97.2 97.2 95.3 94.9
Current Assets to Current Liabilities 0.95 1.00 0.94 0.99 1.02
Total Debt to Total Assets 36.1 36.7 36.8 36.3 36.7
Common Stock Equity to Total Assets 32.4 31.3 29.8 28.5 26.6
Profitability
Return on Average Common Stock Equity 12.0 11.3 11.5 12.0 11.2
Return on Average Common Equity 10.6 10.0 10.2 10.3 9.7
Return on Investment 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.5
We begin to look at the leverage ratios because the leverage ratios are important when a
public company transforms to a stock-offering private company in the market for the first
time. NGC's major leverage ratios are shown in Table 19. From Figure 10, we definitely
52 Energy Information administration/Financial Statistics of Major U.S. Investor-Owned Electric Utilities,
1992, p. 22.
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see NGC's resolution to build a new electricity company in order to market a better stock
price in the future.
Table 19: NGC's Leverage Ratios.
1994 1993 1992 1991
Debt ratio 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.44
Debt-equity ratio 0.38 0.46 0.52 0.80
Current Assets to Current Liabilities 0.79 0.70 0.54 0.67
Total debt to total assets 0.48 0.54 0.55 0.60
1 L
0.8L
0.6 v
I
1991 1992 1993 1994
Figure 10: Comparison of Debt ratio and Debt-Equity Ratio.
Since 1991, NGC has decreased its debt-equity ratio more than investors and CLD
expected. In 1991, NGC's leverage ratio was closer to the composite indicators in the
US. However, NGC has tried to reduce its debt concentration by generating more equity
financing for 5 years. NGC foresees its future in the stock market and is trying to increase
its market value by way of reducing the debt ratio. To be noted, NGC claimed its net debt
to equity ratio was 42% in 1992.53 This value is about a 10% difference from the value
we got from the balance sheet. We believe the value in the balance sheet should be used
as the base for calculation in the US custom and the value in the Annual Report is a
possible result of different accounting practices in the UK.
53 National Grid Company, Annual Report 1991/92.
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NGC's debt ratio and debt-equity ratio are not particularly low compared to the value in
the market place. If we use the financial ratios in fourth quarter 1989 for major industry
groups as the background information in Table 20, we find that the value is normal if you
view it as a normal corporation.
Table 20: Financial ratios for major industry groups, fourth quarter 1989.
All Food Printing Chemi- Petro- Machin- Electric- Retail
Manufac and and cal and leum ery al and Trade
-turing Kindred Publish- Allied and Except Electron
Corpora Product- ing Product- Coal Electric- -ic
-tion s s Product al Equip-
s ment
Debt ratio 0.37 0.52 0.47 0.33 0.34 028 0.27 0.55
Net working 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.00 0.21 0.15 0.15
capital to
total assets
Current ratio 1.47 1.25 1.67 1.30 1.00 1.85 1.47 1.50
Quick ratio 0.76 0.58 1.13 0.68 0.63 0.92 0.76 0.57
Sales to total 1.13 1.33 1.05 0.98 0.82 1.04 1.13 1.92
assets
Net profit 4.0 5.8 4.0 5.9 5.8 2.4 4.0 2.5
margin, %
Inventory 7.5 9.9 15.6 7.9 15.0 5.9 5.7 7.6
turnover
Return on 4.6 7.7 4.2 5.8 4.8 2.5 4.5 4.8
total assets, %
Return on 11.7 16.2 10.2 19.3 14.1 7.7 11.1 8.2
equity, %
Dividend 0.56 0.55 0.49 0.44 0.75 0.58 0.47 0.64
payout ratio
It is clear that debt ratio for NGC seems to be right.
total asset were still too
firms.
However, NGC's fixed assets to
large when we compared the value with most manufacturing
Next, we calculated the liquidity ratios for NGC. NGC's special market characteristics are
shown in Table 21 clearly. Not only are NGC's liquidity indicators high compared with
the values shown by the other companies in the market, but they have been increasing
since 1991.
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Table 21: The Liquidity Ratios for NGC.
1994 1993 1992 1991
Net working capital to total assets 0.145 0.122 0.025 0.093
Current ratio 3.89 2.44 1.10 2.10
Cash ratio 2.23 1.96 0.71 1.33
Quick ratio 3.11 2.42 1.07 1.86
Current ratio
Cash ratio
[Quick ratio
1991 1992 1993 1994
Figure 11: NGC's Liquidity Ratios.
Over the years, NGC has collected much working capital. Moreover, the company's
major turnover is in its transmission business that collects service charges from electricity
suppliers and distribution companies. The profitability ratios are very promising for
investors, too.
Table 22: The Profitability for NGC.
1994 1993 1992 1991
Sales to total assets 0.45 0.49 0.53
Sales to total working capital 3.34 6.33 9.32
Net profit margin 0.79 0.74 0.72 0.70
Return on total assets 0.35 0.37 0.39
Return on equity 0.096 0.101 0.112
Return on current cost average capital employed 0.067
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Although the amount of turnover increases over the years, the sales to total assets and the
sales to total working capital ratios drop over the years. In NGC's annual report NGC
mentions about the changing pricing rule proposed by OFFER. Moreover, OFFER also
strongly recommended NGC to solicit and reinforce the competition in the electricity
sector. NGC consequently and often alertly self-guards its charging principle.
Nevertheless, NGC's management demonstrates its ability to reduce the cost of operation.
As a result, the net profit margin for NGC increases over the years.
In fact, the net profit margin for NGC is larger than the value for most of the firms in the
market. Although its return on equity and return on total assets are normal with respect to
the market practice, no other firms in the market have the same type of net profit margin
ratio as NGC does. It is because NGC's business has much cash transfer and a large
amount of fixed asset. As a result, NGC has little concern about its variable cost. On the
contrary, the most important decision made by NGC may possibly be how it invests in new
fixed assets like machinery or transmission lines.
In conclusion, NGC demonstrated a very promising future before its stock was offered in
the stock market. NGC's profit margin is guaranteed by its market power if OFFER still
awarded the transmission license to NGC. Did NGC abuse its market power? We think
NGC is working on increasing the competition in the market. If we examine the trend of
sales to total working capital and sales to total assets indicators, we know NGC may
carefully use its position in the market and earn a reasonable amount of profit. The
increase of the profit margin is the result of its slim-line management policy. As a matter
of fact, the increase of turnover will possibly meet its steady state point very soon.
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In addition to its profitability, NGC's managers continuously puts NGC's future market
value in mind so they tried to decrease the debt ratios over the years. To some extent the
management successfully reduced the ratio to a normal market level. This affects its
future stock value greatly. The major variable in its future profit would be any dramatic
change of regulation set by OFFER. For instance, if OFFER opens transmission for
competition, then the characteristics of the market may change to a complete different
state.
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Chapter 5 Transmission Price and Cost Components in UK
Introduction
In order to examine the effect of NGC's investment more carefully, we need to understand
the cost and price components of NGC's transmission service. The transmission business
generates most of NGC's turnover. Moreover, the investment strategy of other
generating companies would be affected by the pricing signal sent by NGC. As a result,
NGC's investment strategy and the price impact resulting from it will affect other
investors' decisions. Therefore, examining pricing component is a reasonable next step for
further investigation.
Pool Price Definition
The pool price is separated into pool input price and pool output price. A distribution
company pays the pool output price to get the necessary electricity from suppliers who
consequently receive the pool input price as its clear price for electricity. The pool input
price can be expressed as
Equation 3: Pool Input Price definition.
PIP = SMP = LOLP(VLL- SMP)
where
PIP = Pool Input Price
SMP = System Marginal Price
LOLP = Loss of Load Probability
VLL = Value of Lost Load
On the other hand, the pool output price is the combination of the pool input price and
pool uplift.
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Equation 4: Pool Output Price Definition.
POP = PIP + Pool Uplift
where
POP = Pool Output Price
Compensation to Generators due to Transmission Constraints
After NGC completes its dispatch for the system, the actual loss on the NGC
Transmission System is generated. NGC charges the electricity suppliers by scaling up
their effective Grid Supply Point (GSP) loads including compensation for distribution
losses to cover suppliers' prorate share. The settlement system uses the scale up
generation to produce energy bills for these suppliers.
However, power plants' anticipated generation may not be the same as the result of
NGC's dispatch because of the transmission constraints. For instance, power transmission
on any transmission line can not exceed transmission line's maximum capacity. Because
all lines are connected through the network, the power transmission resulted from the
dispatch affects the system frequency and voltage. Therefore, the plant that is affected by
these conditions should be paid or pay some price for system integrity.
When a plant is constrained on to limit import due to transmission constraints, it is
compensated at its generating bid price. Meanwhile, a plant that is scheduled to be on in
the Unconstrained GOAL Run but is constrained to go off gets a lost profit payment. In
this condition, some plants that have a bid price over SMP are required to run due to the
transmission constraint. If a plant is constrained off to limit exports due to transmission
constraints, it will be rewarded with a lost profit payment. Meanwhile, a plant gets a
consequential bid price payment if it was not scheduled on in the Unconstrained GOAL
Run but is now required to run to replace the plant that was forced off the system. The
lost profit payment in both cases is the difference between SMP and the bid price
multiplied by the MW capacity involved. NGC collects the cost of generation above SMP
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and the lost profit payments for these plants through the Settlement System via the Pool
Uplift.
NGC tries to maintain the electricity quality and prepare for emergency conditions by way
of reserving a certain amount of power generation. Therefore, it estimates an operating
margin in its dispatch. Those generating units ordered to save x MWh are paid by x times
the difference between SMP and their bid prices without regarding to any ancillary
services payments paid by NGC.
Quality And Integrity Of System Operation
On the other hand, because NGC has to maintain the quality and security of electricity
generation, it has to incorporate several additional services which are called "Ancillary
Service Business". These services include Reactive Power, Frequency Response, Black
Start Capability, and Miscellaneous services. It is a natural outcome that NGC has to
purchase reactive power to maintain system balance. Because there are still no meter
systems in place, NGC computes on its previous experience how to buy reactive power
from generators. These generators can obtain the payment from NGC at unit specific
rates that reflect the generating cost of the suppliers. The billing period of reactive power
is half an hour and the total costs of reactive power generation is distributed in proportion
to MWh demand as part of the Pool Uplift payment with all suppliers paying at the same
fJMWh rate.
Secondly, the frequency response ancillary service includes three categories: Primary
Response, Secondary Response and Five Minute Reserve. NGC calculates required
power supply for system security and pays generators on a cost reflective base to reserve
generating capacity. This component is included in the Pool Uplift and billed out to all
suppliers.
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Next, NGC is regulated by OFFER to arm with a black start capability in case of
emergency. NGC pays a capability payment to plants that are designated by NGC to have
the Black Start Capability. These plants use the payment to cover the cost of installing
and maintaining Black Start Capability. NGC uses part of the Pool Uplift payment as the
payment. Finally, NGC provides several miscellaneous services including Canceled Starts,
Hot Standby operation, fast starts and various unique aspects of Pumped Storage
operation.
Pool Uplift Components
In Figure 12, we show the cost component from different players' aspect. It is clear that
the component of the electricity payment is a service with lots of calculations. Based on
the figure and the ancillary services description in the previous paragraph, we can further
deduce the Uplift components.
Equation 5: Daily Uplift Components.
Daily Uplift = TGY + ASD + DPP - (TGD * PIP)
Where
TGY is total generator payment - the total daily payment to generators,
ASD is ancillary services daily payment - the daily sum required by the ancillary services
provider,
DPP is the daily sum which may be used as a means of settling disputed sums outstanding
from previous Settlement Days. The Daily Pool Payment should only be needed in
exceptional circumstances.
TGD is total gross demand - the total consumer demand for the day including transmission
losses.
PIP is Pool Input Price.
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Transmission System Costs
Summary of Current Treatment
Demand Scaled-up
for Share of
NGC Transmission Loss
+Cons
+Res
+Availal
Where:
D=Demand MWh
L=Losses MWh
G=Generation MWh= E
SMP Set with Estimated
iC Transmission Losses &
Operating Margin but
Transmission Constraints
Plus LOLP Payments
from Ds
active power +
equency Response+
SMP=System Marginal Price Black Start Capability+
LOLP=Loss of Load Probability Miscellaneous
PIP=Pool Input Price
=SMP+LOLP ayment * Gen. Above SMP + Lost Profit
U=Uplift ** Lost Profit Only
· ** Available but Not Dispatched
Figure 12: UK Transmission System Costs.
Total generator payment, TGY, is the sum of the following components.
EP Energy payment
OP Operational Payment
AP Availability payment
RP Reserve payment
GMP Genset Maxgen payment
TBP Table B Start-Up payment
MSA Marginal Set Adjustment
GNY Genset Non-Dispatch payment
The major payment that these generators receive is for energy. The energy payment
directly relates to the Pool Input Price that is provided by the suppliers. The net energy
payment is
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Equation 6
NEP = EP - (TGD * PIP)
Equation 7
EP = W* PIP
Combine Equation 6 and Equation 7, we get
Equation 8
NEP = (W- TGD) * PIP
where W is revised unconstrained generation MWh and TGD is also equal to metered
generation MW. It is possible that net energy payment is equal to 0 when the revised
unconstrained generation is the same as total gross demand. Moreover, the net energy
payment is normally expected to be negative because the revised unconstrained generation
is often smaller than the total gross demand.
Operation payment is the difference between TCA and TCW where TCA is Total Metered
Cost - the daily total cost of actual metered generation for all generation sets and TCW is
Total Revised Unconstrained Cost - the daily total cost of generation output for all
generation sets according to the revised unconstrained schedule. This term is often small
unless one of three conditions happens. They are (1) the actual demand for the day is
much greater than that forecast for the unconstrained schedule; or (2) there are a large
number of transmission constraints; or (3) there are a large number of generator failures or
withdrawals.
The Availability Payment is the most complicated component in the Uplift. It is expressed
as
Equation 9: Availability Payment.
AP = max((XP - W - WR),O) * max(LOLP * (VLL - max(BP, SMP)),O)
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where XP is total actual availability - the total daily declared availability of all generation
sets, adjusted for redeclarations and where generation sets failed to prove availability.
WR is revised unconstrained reserve - the daily total reserve across all generation sets in
the revised unconstrained schedule.
LOLP is Loss of Load Probability.
VLL is Value of Lost Load.
BP is the average bid price for all generation sets.
SMP is system marginal price.
When LOLP>0 and BP and SMP are small, AP can be represented as
Equation 10
AP = (XP - W- WR) * LOLP *VLL
In addition to availability payment, NGC has to pay some electricity suppliers for their
spin reserve. The reserve payment is represented as
Equation 11: Reserve Payment.
RP = WR * max((PIP - INCU),O)
where INCU is unconstrained incremental price. The last component of Uplift cost is the
ASD Payment. The payment is used to cover the costs of the ancillary services provider
in purchasing Reactive Power, Operating Margin (Demand/Frequency Control) and Black
Start Capability.
Operational Outturn
When OFFER evaluated the pool price in 1993, it found a major price increase upon the
Uplift component of the Pool Output Price. OFFER separated the Uplift into 4
categories: Operational Outturn, Ancillary Services, Scheduled Reserve and Unscheduled
Availability.54 The result is shown in Table 23.
54 OFFER (Office of Electricity Regulation), "Pool Price Statement", July 1993.
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Table 23:Main Uplift Payment Between 1990 and 1993. (million pounds)
Apr 90
May 90
Jun 90
Jul 90
Aug 90
Sep 90
Oct 90
Nov 90
Dec 90
Jan 91
Feb 91
Mar 91
Apr 91
May91
Jun 91
Jul 91
Aug 91
Sep 91
Oct91
Nov 91
Dec 91
Jan 92
Feb 92
Mar 92
Apr 92
May 92
Jun 92
Jul 92
Aug 92
Sep 92
Oct92
Nov 92
Dec 92
Jan 93
Feb 93
Mar 93
Apr 93
May 93
Jun 93
Operational Ancillary Services Scheduled Reserve Unscheduled Total
Outturn Availability
-2.79
2.78
2.88
7.70
8.40
14.29
17.00
9.47
15.21
14.00
18.40
13.81
14.30
13.94
8.53
19.70
18.23
18.28
26.53
23.49
20.48
22.95
15.66
14.29
7.46
7.24
20.56
15.70
29.36
23.12
26.15
17.09
9.67
10.60
11.62
26.60
34.78
30.02
42.72
8.11
8.97
8.70
8.99
8.99
8.70
8.99
8.44
8.68
8.96
8.30
10.17
10.62
11.29
10.36
10.61
10.85
10.50
10.34
9.60
9.65
9.61
8.56
9.37
9.90
10.70
10.09
9.70
9.61
9.45
10.98
9.90
10.23
9.73
8.78
9.92
11.51
14.62
15.45
2.81
3.71
2.15
1.92
2.12
2.06
2.64
3.62
3.85
4.29
3.78
2.96
2.16
2.00
2.43
1.74
1.86
4.25
3.78
4.07
6.28
2.98
1.50
2.09
2.33
2.63
3.21
3.42
3.00
2.76
4.22
5.53
4.88
4.01
3.86
5.99
7.30
8.223
8.34
0.02
0.00
0.40
0.01
0.10
0.10
0.29
0.39
1.57
0.27
0.38
0.14
1.52
1.25
5.19
0.46
0.20
23.67
24.64
9.73
25.54
8.50
1.33
0.18
0.77
0.03
0.02
0.24
0.06
0.13
3.48
3.23
1.97
1.74
0.25
0.81
0.11
0.18
0.57
8.17
15.47
14.14
18.62
19.63
25.16
28.63
21.92
29.32
27.54
30.87
27.08
28.60
28.49
26.51
32.52
31.15
56.71
65.29
46.32
61.95
44.05
27.05
25.93
20.47
20.60
33.89
29.06
42.03
35.47
44.85
35.77
26.76
26.10
24.53
43.33
53.75
53.08
67.11
The real payment by component are separated into several terms.
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Table 24: Uplift Payment by Component. (million pounds)
1990- 1991- 1992- Jan to Jun Jan to Apr to
1991 1992 1993 1992 Mar 1993 Jun 1993
Operational 121.14 216.37 205.18 35.27 48.83 107.52
Outturn
Ancillary 105.98 121.35 118.99 30.69 28.43 41.58
Services
Scheduled 35.91 35.14 45.85 8.17 13.86 23.87
Reserve
Unscheduled 3.66 102.20 12.72 0.81 2.80 0.87
Availability
Other 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.11
Total 266.84 475.15 382.86 74.96 93.96 173.95
Three of the four
increased. NGC
major components, except Unscheduled Availability, are significantly
did not know why Scheduled Reserve would grow and started to
implement a method to reduce Ancillary service.
Meanwhile, Operational Outturn does relate to the SMP in the system. The single largest
element of the Operational Outturn is constraint costs. It also includes cost related to
demand forecasting errors and plant breakdowns.
Table 25: Components of Operational Outturn 1993. (million pounds)
Jan Feb Mar Jan to Apr May Jun Apr to
Mar Jun
Constraint costs 5.8 7.5 15.6 28.9 18.5 17.1 31.2 66.8
Other costs 4.8 4.12 11.0 19.92 16.28 12.92 11.9 41.1
Total 10.6 11.62 26.6 48.82 34.78 30.02 43.1 107.9
Although both components are increased significantly, the Constraint costs accounted for
the largest part of the operational outturn without doubt. NGC explained that the increase
of these items was the result of the increase of the SMP in the system. However, the SMP
only increased 15% in the period; therefore, there are some other factors contributing a
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major effect of the increase. Meanwhile, the increase of the Constraint Costs could
indicate some of the problems for the system infrastructure.
Table 26: Classification of Constraint Costs in 1993. (million pounds)
Jan Feb Mar Jan to Mar Apr May Jun Apr to Jun
HV: import 2.7 3.5 5.6 11.8 4.6 5.9 10.8 21.3
HV: export 0.7 1.7 5.2 7.6 12.5 9.3 18.2 40.0
HV: total 3.4 5.2 10.8 19.4 17.0 15.2 29.0 61.3
LV: import 2.4 2.3 4.8 9.5 1.4 1.9 2.2 5.5
Total 5.8 7.5 15.6 28.9 18.5 17.1 31.2 66.8
The cost of Low Voltage (LV) constraints dropped about 40%. The Low Voltage
Constraints were related to the impending closure of a small coal-fired plant. Because the
component decreased over time and was not significant, we could ignore the effect
generated by the Low Voltage constraints.
Meanwhile, the HV constraints caused the major cost of system. "An HV export
constraint occurs where a part of the Grid is unable to export all of the in-merit
generation in a region. An export constraint will result in plants in that region being
constrained off the system. Instances of export constraints are the Aire Valley (including
Drax and Eggborough) and the North East (including Teesside and the Scottish
Interconnector)." 55
On the other hand, "an import constraint occurs where a part of the Grid is unable to
import all of the in-merit generation necessary to meet demand in a region. An import
constraint will result in plants in that region being constrained on the system. An
example of an import constraint is the South Coast constraint which sometimes results in
a needfor out-of-merit running of Fawley." 56
55 OFFER, "Pool Price Statement, July 1993", p. 43.
56 Ibid.
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In the period, the cost of HV import constraints increased over 200% and the cost of HV
export constraints increased more than 500%. NGC informs us that the principle HV
constraint costs accounted for by export rather than import constraints. Based on
OFFER's analysis, there are two possible explanations of the increase in HV constraint
costs. First, many occurrences of outages caused an increased level of constrained
running. Some of these outages are related to the Grid refurbishment. The other reason
for the increase is the result of the loss due to those plants with lower bids being
constrained off.
However, OFFER's attitude is very different from NGC's on this term. "I am not aware
of any other competitive market authority which charges customers in order to
compensate potential suppliers for not being able to deliver to the market. In view of the
high and increasing cost of constrained-off payments, I recommend that the Pool also
consider whether, or under what circumstance and to what extent, it is appropriate to
continue making such payments." 57
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57 Ibid.
Chapter 6 Transmission Supergrid Investment Possibility
Introduction
We have discussed NGC's technical performance, its financial performance and the price
component of the transmission business. When we evaluated the technical performance,
we noticed that the North to South transmission does compose a major component of the
total transmission. Nevertheless, the increase of electricity import from France does
decrease the dependency of the North-South transmission business. It can be seen
through the increased purchase from France and decreased purchase from Scotland. Also,
NGC planned to upgrade the import transmission capacity with France.
NGC's financial information did not provide a clear indicator of major investment between
North and South. It is clear that the turnover from transmission business composes the
major part of NGC's income. If the result of economic dispatch of electricity generation
has to be changed due to limited transmission capacity, NGC will obtain payments from
ASD and some other ancillary components. As long as NGC still obtains these types of
payments, there will be no strong incentive for NGC to renew or extend its transmission
capacity.
The incentives for transmission capacity investment seem to be missed in the pricing
formula. The components of the Pool Uplift do not really provide any real profit for NGC
to invest on new transmission capacity. On the other hand, those new generators in the
North obtain a constrained-off payment from other people in the pool. NGC gives these
generators the difference between their bid price and SMP in the system multiplied by the
electricity that should have been generated. Consequently, the generators still get their
profit without generating any power. Even though NGC has already adapted a measure to
reflect the geographical difference of generation, some northern suppliers still earn a
certain amount of the constrained-off payment.
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Interaction Between System Transmission Loss and POP
The cost of transmission losses is largely based on the number provided by NGC. There is
approximately 1.6% of total generation consumed by the transmission losses. If the loss is
priced at Pool Output Price (POP), then the cost of the loss s around £ 70m for a year. In
the meantime, the System Margin Price (SMP) is affected by the loss. The loss of the
system causes SMP to increase by £0.6/MWh in the first 6 months after the privatization
of electricity. It results in £130m more of the cost increase for transmission loss.
Moreover, the increase on SMP due to loss is growing over the year.
While the cost of transmission loss is huge, it is not impossible to counteract the trend
from NGC's point of view. There are many possibilities for NGC to reduce the
transmission losses. Although it can not be completely eliminated, about one third of the
total loss is subjuct to improvements. We can derive the improvement from the
decomposition of the transmission losses. One third of the hourly losses are fixed
(transformer iron losses, corona losses, etc.). The remaining losses are I2R that are
influenced by the demand and generation patterns. NGC investigated the possible avenue
for reducing the transmission losses and found that one third of the variable losses can be
eliminated. The amount is approximately 90MW. The cost saved would be £14m in
annual cost to supply and £30m in POP impact.
NGC's license represents an important factor when we consider the infrastructure
development of the electricity sector. If NGC decides to do nothing to reduce the
transmission losses, somebody will pick up the slack and present a different approach.
Under that circumstance, OFFER would consider to transfer the license of transmission.
Apparently, NGC does not like to be the follower in the market. One way NGC has
considered to lessen the impact of transmission loss is to charge generators and suppliers
with a set of fixed and variable loss tariffs. However, NGC would have to assume
transmission loss responsibility even though the generators and suppliers can easily
influence the variable loss term.
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Loss of Transmission System In 1990
From NGC's document, we know that the transmission losses cost much in its first six
months of operation in 1991. The cost is evaluated by the losses times the Pool Output
Price (POP) in a half-hourly base.
Table 27: Transmission Losses of UK Electricity in the first six months of 1990.
April 1990 £5,880,020
May 1990 £5,751,125
June 1990 £4,652,211
July 1990 £4,648,790
August 1990 £7,552,022
September 1990 f5,718,855
Total Value E34,212,023
From NGC's estimation, it can reduce the POP by at least 0.1/MWh if the losses decrease
100MW. It is worth at least £25,000,000 on an annual basis. NGC also provides the
following definition of the transmission losses' terms.
Line Losses = The losses on the 275kV and 400kV transmission lines and the 400/275kV
transformers, but not on the step-down transformers from 275kV and 400kV to other
voltage.
GSP Losses = The Line Losses plus the losses in the Grid Supply Point (GSP)
transformers (i.e. the step-down transformers from 275kV and 400kV.
BSP Losses = The GSP Losses plus the losses out to the old Bulk Supply Points (BSP -
i.e. primarily the 132kV system).
Based on the 1989 Handbook of Electricity Supply Statistics, the Losses for 1988/89 are
5.619 TWh. It can be derived from Table 28.
58
Table 28: Power Balance of 1988/89 Electricity System in UK.
Power Station Production 231.909 TWh
Imports 16.416
Exports -0.003
Total Supplies 248.322
Sales to Area Boards 238.433
Sales to direct Customers 4.260
Total Sales 242.73
Losses 5.619TWh
Losses Percentage 2.263%
The settlement system also provides the information to estimate the percentage of loss in
the first few months in 1990.
Table 29: Losses in UK in the first six months in 1990.
Month Total Losses (MWh) Total Generation (MWh) %(Losses)
April 1990 318654 21570487 1.477%
May 1990 304498 19814322 1.537%
June 1990 277667 19413472 1.430%
July 1990 300857 19260350 1.562%
August 1990 329329 19283000 1.708%
September 1990 338267 19921976 1.698%
Total 1869272 119263607 1.507%
In the 1990 Seven Year Statement, NGC claimed that the GSP losses on the NGC
Transmission System are about 1.7% at peak.58 If the BSP losses were added to the total
losses, then the total losses increase 0.6% to 2.3% at peak. NGC clearly indicated that
based on historical information for CEGB, flows from North to South were greater off-
peak; therefore, the transmission losses off-peak were greater, too.
58 National Grid Company plc, "The 1990 Seven Year Statement", p. 9.
59
The breakdown of losses components is listed as
* 400 and 275kV I2R line losses
* 400 and 275kV fixed losses (corona discharge, etc.)
* Supergrid transformer copper and iron losses
* 132kV I2R and fixed losses
* Other losses and unaccountables
One of NGC's studies shows that the possible breakdown of different losses' component is
mostly affected by Supergrid line losses, Supergrid transformer losses and 132kV line
losses.
Table 30: Forecasted Energy and Peak Losses for 1990/91.
Energy Peak
Supergrid line losses 1.490% 1.320%
Supergrid transformer losses 0.400% 0.390%
132kV line losses 0.400% 0.580%
Moreover, assuming that the total energy transferred in average is 28000MW and the peak
transmission is 47000MW, then the total losses are shown in Table 31.
Table 31: Forecasted Energy and Peak Losses of 5 Categories.
47000MW 28000MW
Supergrid line losses 518MW 378MW
400kV fixed losses 45 45
275kV fixed losses 23 23
Supergrid Transformer Iron losses 70 70
Supergrid Transformer Copper losses 114 40
Total 770 556
Fixed (%) 18% 25%
Not dispatchable (%) 33% 32%
NGC definitely cannot eliminate some of the losses due to the constraints of current
technology. For instance, the Supergrid Transformer copper losses are relatively
insensitive to the dispatch pattern. The number listed in the Seven Year Statement is
clearly set to describe the trend.
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Table 32: Losses in the system listed in the Seven Year Statement.
BSP Losses (energy) 2.290%
BSP Losses (peak) 2.290%
GSP Losses (energy) 1.890%
GSP Losses (peak) 1.710%
Line Losses (energy) 1.490%
Line Losses (peak) 1.320%
From NGC's sensitivity analysis, if it changes the loading pattern of the system, then the
total losses can be reduced by 30%. To change the system combination will create an
important impact on the losses' amount. I. A. Erinmez and his colleagues investigated the
possible marginal effect when the generators in the system were changed. If there are
500MW new capacity participated in the south, then the total losses can be reduced by
1 15GWh or 4.3%. On the contrary, if there are 500MW new generating capacity joining
the grid in the north, then the total losses will increase by 195GWh or 7.2%. The
difference between these two cases is more than 10%. Therefore, OFFER and NGC
believed they should encourage investors to build new power plants in the south.
Expected Transmission Loss Since 1990
Although we cannot forecast the future demand of the electricity exactly, we can assume a
certain increase rate for growing electricity supply. The estimated growth rate provides us
the base to estimate the cost of the transmission loss in the future. In Table 3 we present
the electricity supplied since 1991. If we assume UK will have a 2% increase of electricity
consumption, we can further derive the cost due to the transmission loss.
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Table 33: Estimated Electricity Demand and Total Transmission Losses.
Electricity Supplied Growth rate (%) Loss percentage (%) Loss (MWh)
(GWh)
1991 271430 2.29% 6215747
1992 267860 -1.32% 2.29% 6133994
1993 274070 2.32% 2.29% 6276204
1994 269230 -1.77% 2.29% 6165367
1995 274615 2% 2.29% 6288674
1996 280107 2% 2.29% 6414448
1997 285709 2% 2.29% 6542737
1998 291423 2% 2.29% 6807063
1999 297252 2% 2.29% 4429050
2000 303197 2% 2.29% 6943205
2001 309261 2% 2.29% 7082069
2002 315446 2% 2.29% 7223710
2003 321755 2% 2.29% 7368184
2004 328190 2% 2.29% 7515548
2005 334754 2% 2.29% 7665859
2006 341449 2% 2.29% 7819176
2007 348278 2% 2.29% 7975560
2008 355243 2% 2.29% 8135071
2009 362348 2% 2.29% 8297772
2010 369595 2% 2.29% 8463728
Based on the numbers we get and the percentage provided in Table 30, we can present a
scenario to estimate the transmission losses from different types of reasons. Moreover, we
will assume the SMP in the system is kept around 20 UMWh. As a result, the cost can be
estimated.
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Table 34: Estimated cost of the transmission losses.
Electricity Supergrid Supergrid 132 kV line Cost of the
Supplied line losses transformer losses transmission
(GWh) losses losses (million
F)
1991 271430 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 124.3
1992 267860 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 122.7
1993 274070 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 125.5
1994 269230 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 123.3
1995 274615 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 125.8
1996 280107 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 128.3
1997 285709 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 130.9
1998 291423 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 133.5
1999 297252 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 136.1
2000 303197 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 138.9
2001 309261 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 141.6
2002 315446 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 144.5
2003 321755 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 147.4
2004 328190 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 150.3
2005 334754 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 153.3
2006 341449 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 156.4
2007 348278 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 159.5
2008 355243 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 162.7
2009 362348 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 166.0
2010 369595 1.49% 0.4% 0.4% 169.3
However, we need to bear in mind tat not all the loss can be eliminated by changing the
dispatch pattern. For instance, the fixed losses and the transformer losses cannot be
eliminated by changing the merit dispatch. However, the Supergrid transmission line
losses can be reduced through a different approach.
First, NGC and OFFER recommend a transmission incentive that will encourage people to
build generating facilities in southern regions and discourage people from building plants
in northern regions. In their study, the approach would reduce the variable transmission
line losses up to 30%.
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Next, we investigate the scenario that would allow NGC to transfer electricity from
northern regions to southern regions with fewer losses. If NGC can build extra
transmission capacity to transfer electricity, then the I2R losses are decreased. We may
assume that the transmission capacity is doubled. Under the circumstance, the variable
transmission losses can be decreased by 50% at most. Therefore, the result will be greatly
reduced losses.
Finally, we can combine both approaches and create a solution for reducing the
transmission losses. However, it seems that the benefit obtained from this approach may
not be worth the investment. To evaluate these strategies would require more system
specific data and a large scale effort. Because we only want to evaluate the investment
strategy of the company and its transmission capital investment, the problem will be left
for future research.
The result of the simple simulation with these three approaches is shown in Table 35. We
found that the most economic approach would be to build new transmission capacity to
transfer electricity from northern regions to southern regions.
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Table 35: Estimated cost saved for three approaches.
Saved Cost saved Saved Cost saved Saved Cost saved
percentage by the first percentage by the percentage by the third
of the first strategy of the second of the third strategy
strategy (million £) second strategy strategy (million £)
strategy (million £)
1991 30% 24.3 50% 40.4 65% 52.6
1992 30% 23.9 50% 39.9 65% 51.9
1993 30% 24.5 50% 40.8 65% 53.1
1994 30% 24.1 50% 40.1 65% 52.1
1995 30% 24.6 50% 40.9 65% 53.2
1996 30% 25.0 50% 41.7 65% 54.3
1997 30% 25.5 50% 42.6 65% 55.3
1998 30% 26.1 50% 43.4 65% 56.4
1999 30% 26.6 50% 44.3 65% 57.6
2000 30% 27.1 50% 45.1 65% 58.7
2001 30% 27.6 50% 46.1 65% 59.9
2002 30% 28.2 50% 47.0 65% 61.1
2003 30% 28.8 50% 47.9 65% 62.3
2004 30% 29.3 50% 48.9 65% 63.5
2005 30% 29.9 50% 49.9 65% 64.8
2006 30% 30.5 50% 50.9 65% 66.1
2007 30% 31.1 50% 51.9 65% 67.5
2008 30% 31.8 50% 52.9 65% 68.8
2009 30% 32.4 50% 54.0 65% 70.2
2010 30% 33.0 50% 55.1 65% 71.6
Moreover, NGC bought much electricity from EdF and paid Scottish Power and the
northern part of the suppliers a certain amount of constrained-off payment. Because the
current price component does not clearly specify the payment for NGC's transmission
capital investment, NGC is not obligated to invest in building new transmission lines.
On the other hand, many generators in northern regions still earn a certain amount of
profit without generating any electricity as long as they are efficient power plants with a
low bidding price. Although NGC has already started its new pricing formula to reflect
the geographical difference, the result is not very satisfactory. NGC still paid much to
many suppliers for constrained-off payment.
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However, there is no clear rule to split the saved cost for the transmission capacity
investment. On the contrary, based on the current pricing formula, northern suppliers
would still earn certain amount of profit with no transaction cost and no investment cost.
Unless the price constrained-off component is canceled from the price formula, nobody
would be willing to invest in the new transmission capacity.
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Chapter 7 Incentive of Transmission Supergrid Investment
Introduction
We have discussed the transmission sector in UK. Because the current transmission
pricing formula and OFFER's regulations do not provide clear signals to encourage
transmission investment, NGC is not planning major investment on upgrade of the
supergrid transmission line at the moment. Moreover, any such investment will give no
significant profit for NGC's operation. Consequently NGC does not like any major
investment on transmission capacity. Generally electric companies do not invest in the
transmission capacity constantly. They all consider the transmission investment to be a
very long term investment without clear profit involved. Therefore, transmission capacity
investment was not an issue on the table when they privatized the electricity sector.
As the purpose of the thesis, we would like to go for the first step on the issue of the
transmission sector under deregulation. Because the issue may be very important in the
long term while it is not an emergent issue on the table, we would only give some
qualitative descriptions on incentives and obstacles on transmission capacity investment.
List of Incentives and Obstacles for Transmission System Development
Over the years, the issue of the transmission capital investment is not a major issue for
electricity deregulation. The issue does relate to other issues like Pool Uplift Component
hike, system SMP, and quality of the electricity served. For instance, the outages of some
EdF power plants over the years did cause frequency and voltage deviation for UK
electricity system.
The incentives currently installed to encourage transmission capacity investment include
the following points.
* Electricity suppliers and NGC split the cost of the transmission capital investment.
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Whenever there is a new applicant for power generation in the system, NGC considers
whether the transmission capacity is capable of transferring the power. If the capacity
is not enough to support the job, then NGC will upgrade the capacity. NGC would
split the cost with the generator. Therefore, half of NGC's construction cost is saved
and paid by its customers. Under that circumstance, NGC would have strong
incentive to upgrade the transmission capacity around the grid close to the generators.
* NGC will earn more profit if they can transfer more electricity.
Because the majority of NGC's turnover is from the service charge of the electricity
transmission, NGC has an incentive to build more transmission capacity to transfer
electricity. However, the cost of building new transmission capacity is not low at all.
Therefore, there is no strong incentives for NGC to invest in the transmission capacity
that would diminish its profit.
* Transmission assets have a very long lifetime in use.
From Table 4, we know the lifetime for the transmission capacity is longer than other
generation equipment in utility. The long lifetime does give investor advantage when
we consider the depreciation of NGC's assets. Therefore, NGC has a low
depreciation charge when they calculate their asset value.
Meanwhile, the investors do have to face following problems.
* The transmission price component does not reflect the investment cost for the long
run.
When we considered the Pool Price component, we could not find any significant
component to encourage transmission capacity investment. The Pool Output Price is
the sum of the Pool Input Price and Daily Pool Uplift. Because PIP is The System
Margin Price that does reflect the long-term investment cost but the short-term
marginal cost, it does not generate much incentive for investors. On the other hand,
the Pool Uplift component provides some negative incentive for transmission capacity
upgrade. For instance, NGC earns some administrative charge if there are some
constrained-on and constrained-off conditions in the system. Meanwhile, these
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generators still earn the bid price payment or a consequential lost profit payment if
they are involved with the dispatch.
* Investor needs to bear a loan with a very long term of pay-back period.
Because the cost of the transmission capacity investment is usually large, investors
often do not have enough cash to pay for the investment in the beginning. On the
other hand, the lifetime of the transmission capacity is so long and the stamp price for
transmission tends to be so small that investors need to wait for a very long time to
earn their money back. Therefore, they do not consider that investing on the
transmission capacity is a wise decision.
* Current regulation does not encourage the investment in the transmission capacity.
At the moment, OFFER still believes that transmission company should be a monopoly
in the market to answer regulators' requirement to maintain the quality. NGC is the
only candidate. On the other hand, OFFER hopes to encourage the competition in the
market so they ask NGC not to charge a high price on transmission. Meanwhile, the
investment incentive does not exist in the pricing formula. As the result, the investors
are discouraged.
* Much electricity can be importedfrom France.
EdF's SMP is so low and EdF is so close to England that NGC does have a strong
incentive to put EdF's power into their economic dispatch. Meanwhile, RECs like to
purchase power from EdF with a minimum wheeling practice. Therefore, the incentive
to upgrade transmission capacity is hindered.
Although there are some incentives for transmission investment, the overall picture for
investors is not clear. They would have no incentive to build their own transmission
capacity to compete with NGC, the dispatcher of the system. On the other hand, NGC
does not have an incentive to build new capacity because it does not gain much profit from
the investment.
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Disadvanges of Current Regulation
In the meantime, the regulator has not put strong emphasis on the issue. Because NGC's
financial performance is still excellent and competition in the electricity market is still
growing, OFFER put less effort on the issue and turned to the issue of encouraging
competition. The advantage of current regulation can be organized as follows.
* The pricing mechanism does not provide a clear signal for transmission asset's
investment.
* There is only one transmission company, NGC, in the market to dispatch and transfer
electricity.
On the other hand, OFFER does put the transmission pricing issue on the table if it has the
opportunity to address the issue. For instance, OFFER pressed NGC to find the reason
that the Uplift component was rising in the recent years. However, NGC explained that
the southern regions are lacking the generating capacity to cause the large Uplift payment.
However, NGC did not mention any major transmission facility upgrade or construction.
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Chapter 8 Conclusion
In this thesis, we discuss the investment strategy used by NGC. Its strategies are not much
difference from what National Power and PowerGen used. Its track record of technical
operation is very good. The productivity per employee is growing since vesting. The
financial performance gives investors strong confidence for its future.
However, there are no major transmission assets invested in these years. Although NGC
has upgraded some major connection with Scottish Power and EdF, it does not have any
plan to extend the transmission capacity between north and south. A possible explanation
is that the current pricing mechanism will not give NGC clear incentives to invest on new
transmission capacity. On the contrary, NGC can earn additional profit through its limited
transmission capacity.
Outside investors can not perceive any clear indication from the market to invest on new
transmission capacity. The UK lost much electricity through the transmission loss.
Although NGC does provide an avenue for encouraging more southern generation, the
result still shows that RECs would import a lot from EdF. As a result, the quality of the
electricity closely correlated with EdF's operation.
Generators in the North and Scotland still earn a certain amount of profit from the
constrained-off payment. Under the circumstances, NGC will earn administrative fees
from the operation. After a new pricing structure is installed, the imbalance situation
shows some improvement. The result does not prove to be a best solution. Still, the
system depends much on the imports from EdF.
To some extent, one of the key problem is the pricing formula and the current regulation.
In the transmission market, there is only one single buyer and seller, NGC. As long as
NGC can be the only dispatcher and system controller, any transmission investor will have
to deal with its only competitor and customer, NGC. Moreover, the pricing mechanism
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does not favor any independent transmission investor in the market. They are willing to
invest in some other assets like power plants. It is clear that the signal to encourage new
transmission investment is missing.
Nevertheless, NGC's investment performance is excellent from NGC's stock holders'
point of view. They are more encouraged by NGC's new management strategy.
Although to create lucid signals for transmission investment is not an urgent issue, OFFER
still needs to inspect the possibility of a modification of current regulation to prevent
problems in the future.
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Appendix A The Investment Policy and operation performance of the National
Power
National Power is the biggest power provider after the privatization because it inherits
over a half of total thermal generation capacity belonging to CEGB. In 1991, 46% of the
total electricity consumed was provided by National Power. Over the years, National
Power demonstrated strong performance throughout its business records. The four year
balance sheet and cash flow statement are listed at the end of this appendix.
Because National Power still had to honor its contract with the British Coal, it had an
extra economical burden in its business operation. The government has already expressed
its intention to privatize the British Coal. However, any dramatic change of relation
between the British Coal and National Power will greatly affect the privatization process
of the British Coal. Therefore, National Power adopted a different policy. It piled up all
the extra coal they bought during this period. Furthermore, it invested in some other type
of generation technologies to decrease the fuel dependence.
As a result of the policy, the days of inventory held increased over time. Table Al shows
the trend.59
Table Al. National Power Inventory Statistics60
03/27/94 03/28/93 03/31/92 03/31/91
Days Invn Held 64.60 52.29 39.56 23.31
Invn/Cur. Asset 28.07 42.81 38.33 29.29
Invn Turnover 5.57 6.88 9.10 15.44
Table Al also indicates that the inventory turnover decreased overtime. As the turnover
rate dropped, the management faced some problems such as the rate of cash inflow did not
reflect the rate of cash outflow. In 1994, despite a reduction of 8 million tons of coal
59 WorldScope Global Database, Company Record: National Power.
60 Ibid.
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purchases, the company still had 12 million tons of coal in stock. The management
seriously expresses the concern of the coal contract in its 1994 annual business review. 6'
To reduce the operating cost, National Power announced a series of plant closing
activities. From 1990 to 1994, the company has closed the plants that amount to 9,000
megawatts of generation capacity. All the plants closed are coal fired power plants with
an old design. Because these plants have an old design and low thermal efficiency
compared to the new generation technology like CCGT, National Power decided to close
these plants with the cost of losing market share. The balance sheet proves that the
management's decision was right. Although the total turnover and market share decrease,
the operating cost decreases more than the amount of decrease in turnover. Therefore,
the actual profit margin was increased by the policy.
Combined with closing old plants, reducing the work force is also an important step to
reduce operating cost. At the end of 1994, the power station staffing level was reduced
by 46% and non-power station staffing level was reduced by 51% compared to the 1992
level.
Table A2. Average number of employees during the financial year. National Power6 2
Employee numbers 1994 1993 1992
Power station staff 5220 7779 9707
Non-power station staff 1736 2155 3570
Total average number of employees 6955 9934 13277
Furthermore, the same policy also reflects the percentage of total employees'
remuneration of the total operating cost. From Table A3, we can easily see that the cost
of the employees' remuneration occupied a smaller share of the total operating cost
overtime. It is possible that National Power hired too many employees before the vesting.
Under the privatization scheme, the company was not completely responsible to the
government. Therefore, the control of the work force was back to National Power's
hand.
61 National Power Annual Review, 1994, p. 8.
62 Data from the annual reports of Natioanl Power, 1992, 1993, 1994.
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Table A3. Employees' remuneration: Salaries and other staff cost, including
Directors' remuneration of National Power63
1994 1993 1992 1991
m m m m
Wages and salaries 185 242 296 297
Social security costs 15 21 24 24
Other pension costs 20 7 31 39
Supplementary payments relating to change to new pay 22
agreements and relocation of staff
Total employees' remuneration 220 292 351 360
Total operating cost 2907 3749 4176 3951
Ratio 7.6% 7.9% 8.4% 9.1%
Before the company was privatized, the management of the CEGB had already decided to
build new CCGT (Combined Cycle Gas Turbine) plants. The CCGT technology has a
higher thermal efficiency than a traditional coal fire plant did. Meanwhile, the British Gas
was privatized before CEGB. In those years, gas became a really competitive fuel in the
market. By 1994, the National Power had already built three CCGT plants in
Killingholme in south Humberside, Deeside in North Wales and at Little Barford in
Bedfordshire. One 1500 megawatt CCGT at Staythorpe in Nottinghamshire is in the
process of paper work. The report generated by the OFFER (OFFER stands for Office
for Office Of Electricity Regulation) also indicated that more of the new independent
generators are also CCGT type plants. It is in National Power's interest to stay
competitive in the market. Therefore, it is a necessary step to invest on CCGT
technology.
Because National Power is building new CCGT plants, it needs some type of proof to
safeguard the fuel resource. National Power used several methods to secure the gas
resource. For instance, the National Power agreed to purchase the whole gas output of
the Caister field in the North Sea.64 In 1991, it reached a 15 year agreement with
Norwegian suppliers. Also, in 1991, it announced an agreement with Ranger Oil for gas
from two blocks in the Anglia Field in the southern North Sea.65
63 Ibid.
64 Annual Review and Summary Financial Statement 1991, National Power, p. 6.
65 Ibid.
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After the vesting, National Power owned a certain amount of cash and financial resources.
Since the company did not have the obligation to give all the profit back to the
government any more, it could look for profitable opportunity to increase the profit
margin. For instance, in 1994, it finished the financial closing on the purchase of Pego
power station in Portugal with the other consortium members.66 Moreover, the company
viewed that the electricity market in the US could allow the National Power to earn
reasonable profit. The company decided to purchase American National Power, a US
power generation company, with a price of £103million.6 7 Therefore, the company gained
a foothold among a gradually competitive environment.
However, the investment decision is not always rewarding. For instance, the National
Power withdrew from a joint venture in Malaysia in July 1993.68 The result of other
investments including a project with India is still uncertain. Nevertheless, the privatization
process gave the electricity industry a new avenue to earn profit.69
On the other hand, the National Power still wants to escape some risk due to the pool
pricing mechanism. It enthusiastically sought to sign bilateral contracts with regional
electricity companies. In its Annual Review 1993, it is described that National Power had
a certain amount of electricity sale contract with RECs and sold 280TWh to them.70 As a
result, the pool bidding mechanism only had a modest adverse impact on the National
Power's profit earning scheme.7 1
Because the National Power had a certain amount of experience in building a cogeneration
project and it perceived any new cogeneration project could be a possibly small
competitor in the market, it looked for an opportunity to participating cogeneration
6 6 National Power Annual Review 1994, National Power, p. 11.
6 7 National Power Report and Accounts 1994, National Power, p. 4.
6 8 WorldScope Global Database, Company Record: National Power.
69 Ibid.
7 0 National Power Annual Review 1993, p. 8.
71 National Power Report and Accounts 1994, p.4 .
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project.72 It demonstrated a strong understanding of cogeneration, too.7 3 Because there
are some other competitors like the National Nuclear in the market, the behavior was not
treated as a monopoly or oligopoly strategic move.
Moreover, it started to investigate the opportunity for generation from renewable energy
through its subsidy, National Wind Power Limited. It has already built four 25MW wind
farms at Camrnmaes in Wales. 74 To some extent, this is beneficial to the overall electricity
generation because normally a small independent renewable energy developer does not
have enough financial resources to reach economic scale. However, the National Power
was able to provide strong technical and financial assistance to renewable energy
developers.
The overall result which showed in the company's financial balance sheet is very
promising. Consider EPS (Earning per share), 5
Table A4. Earning Per Share and Its Growth Rate, National Power.
1994 1993 1992 1991
EPS 0.41 0.33 0.29 0.26
Growth rate 24.24% 13.79% 11.54%
Also the total equity growth rate is7 6
Table A5. Equity Growth Rate, National Power.
1994 1993 1992 1991
Equity rowth 14.22% 14.16% 14.00%
The operating income growth rate and the net income growth rate are 77
72 National Power through its subsidy, National Power Cogen, participate in Albright & Wilson Ltd,
Sterling Organics Ltd, and Lancaster University. They are described in the National Power Annual
Review 1993.
73 Naional Power Annual Review and Summary Financial Statement 1992, p. 11.
74 National Power Annual Review 1993, p. 10.
75 Data from National Power Annual Review 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
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Table A6. Operating Income and Net Income and Their Growth Rate, National
Power.
1994 1993 1992 1991
Oper Income 677 580 514 434
Growth of Oper Income 16.72% 12.84% 18.43%
Net Income 522 420 365 176
Growth of Net Income 24.29% 15.07% 107.39%
From the income growth rate and equity rate, we perceive that the trend of the company is
very promising.
Consider the profitability ratios the company shows78
Table A7. Profitability Ratios of National Power
1994 1993 1992 1991
Net Inc Margin 14.34 9.66 7.76 4.71
Oper. Inc./Tot. Capital 23.35 22.51 24.71 19.95
Return on Inv. 19.59 17.50 17.75 10.16
Return on Equity 22.56 20.72 20.53 9.71
Return on Assets 12.79 11.00 10.50 5.95
We use the composite financial information of major U.S. Investor-owned electric utilities
as the benchmark to do the comparison7 9:
Table A8. Profitability Ratios of Major U.S. Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, 1992.
1992 1991 1990 1989
Return on Average Common Stock Equity 12.0 11.3 11.5 12.0
Return on Average Common Equity 10.6 10.0 10.2 10.3
Return on Investment 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.7
Net Income Margin 9.9 9.3 9.8 10.4
Oper. Inc./Total capital 8.93 9.20 8.94 9.16
Return on Assets 3.63 3.48 3.54 3.72
After we compare these two tables, we conclude that the National Power outperforms
most U.S. investor-owned utilities in the profit aspect. Meanwhile, the majority of the
78 Ibid.
79 Energy Information Administration/ Financial Statistics of Major U.S. Investor-Owned Electric
Utilities, 1992, p. 22.
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U.S. investor-owned utilities may have too much generation capacity that causes a great
financial burden on these utilities to pay the investment cost.
Furthermore, we examine the asset utilization factor and compare it to the composite
measure of major investor-owned utilities.8 0
Table A9. Total Asset Turnover Rate of National Power
1994 1993 1992 1991
Total Asset Turnover 0.74 0.96 1.11 1.13
The composite total asset turnover for major U.S. investor-owned electric utilities8 ':
199 199 1990 1989
T otal Asse t Turnover 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36
The National Power apparently has a higher total asset turnover ratio compared to the
benchmark value. The result may reflect that the privatized company had much to offer
for sale rather than a traditional electric utility.
Now let's consider the leverage ratio of the National Power. To understand how the
management deals with the debt and equity, we can use following indicators8 2:
Table All. Leverage Ratios of National Power.
1994 1993 1992 1991
Total Debt%Total Capital 28.47 21.68 23.67 22.12
PFD stock%total capital 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Debt%total asset 21.37 14.14 14.88 13.08
LT debt% total capital 27.75 20.47 22.36 17.26
Equity%total capital 72.19 79.46 77.60 82.74
COM EQTY%total asset 53.63 51.06 47.96 46.06
For the composite indicators for major U.S. investor-owned electric utilities8 3:
80 Data from National Power Annual Review 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994.
s Energy Information Administration/ Financial Statistics of Major U.S. Investor-Owned Electric
Utilities, 1992, p. 22.
82 WorldScope Global Database, Company Record: National Power.
83 Energy Information Administration/ Financial Statistics of Major U.S. Investor-Owned Electric
Utilities, 1992, p. 22.
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Table A12. Leverage Ratios of Major U.S. Investor-owned electric utilities.
1992 1991 1990 1989
Total Debt%Total Capital 50.1 50.3 50.4 49.6
PFD stock%total capital 7.0 7.1 7.3 7.6
Total Debt%total asset 36.1 36.7 36.8 36.3
LT debt% total capital 47.7 48.3 48.1 47.9
Equity%total capital 42.9 42.6 42.3 42.7
COM EQTY%total asset 30.9 31.1 30.9 31.2
Apparently, National Power has a very low debt ratio. Because the National Power
gained a lot of cash and cash-equivalent after it was privatized, its management did not
perceive a need for debt operation. This also means the company can flexibly change its
practice of borrowing in the short run.
If we check the liquidity ratios of National Power, it shows84
Table A13. Liquidity Ratios of National Power.
1994 1993 1992 1991
Current ratio 1.75 1.07 1.18 1.12
Quick ratio 1.22 0.59 0.71 0.76
Compared it to the composite measures from the major U.S. investor-owned utilities85:
Table A14. Liquidity Ratios of Major U.S. Investor-owned electric utilities.
1992 1991 1990 1989
Current ratio 0.95 1.0 0.94 0.99
Quick ratio 0.44 0.49 0.43 0.51
It is possible that the National Power held too much cash in its hand. Therefore, the
company does not have to worry about its cash flow. On the contrary, the company
should notice more of its investment decision. The indication is that the management
philosophy may be too conservative.
84 WorldScope Global Database, Company Record: National Power.
85 Energy Information Administration/ Financial Statistics of Major U.S. Investor-Owned Electric
Utilities, 1992, p. 22.
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In the stock market, the company presented a great record. In March 1994, it had a P/E
ratio equal to 11.26.86 The P/E ratio is very high compared to other companies in the
market. The value indicates that the National Power's stock has low risk and the investors
expect high dividend growth. The market-to-book ratio is 2.23.87 The earliest investors
had already experienced a growth of 123% of stock price increase. The risk of the stock,
beta, is equal 1.35.88 Normally, an electric utility has a lower beta that is smaller than 1.
However, the National Power showed reverse characteristics. It is possible that the
company has become so competitive that the risk associated with the stock has its own
characteristic.
On the other hand, OFFER and many consumers suspect that National Power with
PowerGen overexploits their market power. In order to protect the electricity consumers
and encourage market competition, OFFER did some investigation and issued a report in
1994.89 The regulator used the rate of return on capital employed as the indicator to
access the monopoly power of both companies. Moreover, National Power used the
composite value of the companies in the London stock market as the comparison. 90
Table A15. Average Percentage Return on Capital Employed: Trading Assets
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Manufacturing 21.4 20.4 18.9 14.9 13.0
Non-Manufacturing 21.0 19.7 17.3 13.7 12.1
All Companies 21.2 20.1 18.1 14.3 12.6
8 6 WorldScope Global Database, Company Record: National Power.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 OFFER, "Decision On A Monopolies And Mergers Commission Reference, February 1994."
9 0 Ibid.
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Table A16. Average Percentage Return on Capital Employed: Trading Assets
Excluding Assets in the Course of Construction.
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Manufacturing 22.0 21.0 19.5 15.4 13.4
Non-Manufacturing 22.4 20.8 18.0 14.1 12.4
All Companies 22.2 20.9 18.8 14.8 12.9
Then the controversy exists on how to calculate ROCE of the company. OFFER excludes
the assets in the course of construction in the total capital employed but National Power
put the assets in the course of construction as the capital employed. The result is shown in
Table 18.9 '
Table A17. Return on Capital Employed (ROCE), National Power.
Figure in £m OFFER's National Power's
Calculation* Calculations**
1992 1993 1992 1993
Net Capital 2250 2104 2773 3074
Employed*
Profits Before 525 599 530 607
Interest &
Tax
ROCE % 23.3 28.5 19.1 19.7
* Group, excluding assets in course of construction
** THE UK Business, including assets in course of construction
Obviously, National Power indeed outperforms the majority of the companies in the
London stock markets. Although the result from National Power's own calculation is low
than OFFER's, the value is still higher than the majority firms in the market. National
Power claimed that the sizable amount of profit was gained through the electricity
contracts signed before the vesting with RECs.9 2 Therefore, OFFER ought not to add the
profit of these contracts into the calculation. OFFER rebutted that RECs are constrained
by the market power exerted by National Power and PowerGen. Moreover, most of the
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91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
time since the vesting, either National Power or PowerGen set the SMP (system marginal
price). 9 3
Because the electricity sector has been reorganized and the final price in the supply side is
not set by regulators any more, the regulator needs to figure out some way to adjust the
price indirectly. If OFFER can change the market to have more players in the market,
then the bidding price should be dropped very quickly. Currently, all the type of plants
except National Power and PowerGen's always bid on the base load region. Only
National Power and PowerGen have peak load power plants. We would leave the
discussion to section IV when we discuss the UK electricity sector after privatization.
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3 Ibid.
Balance sheets at 27 March 1994
Fixed assets
Tangible fixed assets
Fuel security stocks
Investments
Total fixed assets
Current assets
Stocks
Debtors: recoverable within one
year
Debtors: recoverable after more
than one year
Investments
Cash and short-term deposits
Total current assets
Bank overdrafts
Other creditors
Creditors: amounts falling due
within one year
Net current assets
Total assets less current liabilities
Convertible bonds
Other creditors
Creditors: amounts falling due after
more than one year
Provisions for liabilities and
charges
Net assets employed
Capital and reserves
Called up share capital
Share premium account
Capital reserve
Special reserve
Profit and loss account
Shareholders' funds - equity
Minority interests - equity
Total equity
Debt/equity ratio
m
1994 1993 1992 1991
m m m
3144 2984
237
187 72
3331 3293
423
383
2725
237
47
3009
2451
237
2
2690
503 458 343
351 342 503
151 117
328
225
1510
-28
-809
-837
673
4004
-244
-763
-1007
104
81
1156
-40
-1048
-1088
68
3361
-582
-582
57
177
99
1133
-41
-963
-1004
129
3138
55
257
1158
-1042
-1042
116
2806
-581 -381
-337 -460 -510 -656
2660 2319 2047 1769
640
4
415
480
1121
2660
638
1
415
480
785
2319
637
415
230
765
2047
637
415
480
237
1769
2660 2319 2047 1769
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Consolidated cash flow statement for the year ended 31 March 1992 Unit M
1992 1991
Operating activities
Operating profit 525 427
Depreciation charged against operating profit 210 155
Decrease in working capital 27 334
Issue of plant spares 50 55
Provisions utilized -154 -204
Other operating activities 107 40
Net cash inflow from operating activities 765 807
Net interest (paid)/received -8 47
Dividends paid -108
Net cash (outflow)/inflow from returns on investments
and servicing of finance -116 47
Taxation
Corporation tax paid after utilization of certificate of tax deposit -87 -125
Net cash outflow from investing activities -805 -462
Net cash (outflow)/inflow before financing activities -243 267
Net cash inflow from financing activities 70 3
(Decrease)/increase in net cash and cash equivalents -173 270
Net cash and cash equivalents at 1 April 1991 268 -2
Net cash and cash equivalents at 31 March 1992 95 268
Consolidated cash flow statement
For the financial year ended 28 March 1993 1993 1992
m m
Net cash inflow from operating activities 799 765
Net interest paid -21 -8
Dividends paid -120 -108
Net cash outflow from returns on investments and servicing of -141 -116
finance
Taxation
Corporation tax paid after utilization of Certificate of tax deposit -143 -87
Net cash outflow from investing activities -531 -805
Net cash outflow before financing activities -16 -243
Net cash inflow from financing activities 10 70
Decrease in net cash and cash equivalents -6 -173
Net cash and cash equivalents at 1 April 1992 95 268
Net cash and cash equivalents at 28 March 1993 89 95
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Consolidated cash flow statement 1994 1993
for the financial year ended 27 March 1994 m m
Net cash inflow from operating activities 832 799
Net interest paid -33 -21
Dividends paid -141 -120
Net cash outflow from returns on investments and servicing of -174 -141
finance
Tax paid - corporation tax -151 -143
Investing activities
Purchase of fixed assets excluding plant spares -436 -551
Purchase of subsidiary undertaking -103
Other investing activities 38 20
Net cash outflow from investing activities -501 -531
Net cash inflow/(outflow) before financing activities 6 -16
Financing activities
Issue of 6 1/4 % Euro Dollar Bonds 2003 197
Issue of 6 1/4 % Convertible Bonds 2008 244
Other financing activities 3 10
Net cash inflow from financing activities 444 10
Increase/(decrease) in net cash and cash equivalents 450 -6
Net cash and cash equivalents at 29 March 1993 89 95
Net cash and cash equivalents at 27 March 1994 539 89
Consolidated profit and loss account
Turnover: continuing operations
Operating costs
Operating profit: continuing operations
Net interest payable and other similar
charges
Profit on ordinary activities before
exceptional items taxation
Exceptional items
Profit on ordinary activities before
taxation
Tax on profit on ordinary activities
Profit on ordinary activities after
taxation
Extraordinary items
Profit/(Ioss) for the financial year
Dividends
Retained profit for the financial year
Earnings per share - actual
Earnings per share - pro forma
Dividend per share
Dividend cover
Unit
m
m
m
m
1993
4348
-3749
599
-19
1992
4701
-4176
525
-11
m
Actual
1991
4378
-3951
427
52
479
m
m 580 514 479
m
m
-160 -149 -149
420 365 330
m
m
m
m
p
p
p
times
420
-135
285
32.9
365
-116
249
28.6
10.6 9.1
3.1 3.1
-124
206
-70
136
25.89
23.54
5.5
86
l
I
-
Summary consolidated profit and loss account 1994 1993
m m
Turnover: continuing operations 3641 4348
Operating costs -2952 -3749
Exceptional item 45
Total operating costs -2907 -3749
Operating profit: continuing operations 734 599
Income from interests in associated undertakings 1
Interest receivable and similar income 29 49
Interest payable and similar charges -87 -68
Profit on ordinary activities before taxation and 632 580
exceptional item
Exceptional item 45
Profit on ordinary activities before taxation 677 580
Tax on profit on ordinary activities -155 -160
Profit on ordinary activities after taxation 522 420
Dividends -160 -135
Retained profit for the financial year 362 285
Earnings per share:
Before exceptional item and after taxation p 37.3 32.9
Attributable to exceptional item p 3.6
After exceptional item and taxation p 40.9 32.9
Dividend per share p 12.5 10.6
Dividend cover before exceptional item times 3 3.1
Dividend cover after exceptional item times 3.3 3.1
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Appendix B. The Investment Policy and operation performance of the PowerGen
PowerGen is the second largest investor-owned electricity in England and Wales. It
owned 21 power stations that, at 31st December 1990, had a total DNC of 18,764MW.
In the 1990 account year, these power stations provided 76.5TWh, that is about 30% of
total electricity sale in England and Wales. Approximately 93% of the output were
generated by coal-fired power stations and dual-fired power stations using coal as fuel.
The cost of coal in 1991 accounted for over 90 percent of the total operating cost. 9 4
Fundamentally, the National Power is the market leader and the PowerGen is the largest
market follower. PowerGen's business policy is very similar to that of the National
Power. Because it also had to honor the contract with the British Coal, it started to pile up
extra coal. As a result, days of inventory turnover were increased over time.
Table B1. Inventory Information of PowerGen.
04/03/94 04/04/93 03/29/92 03/31/91
Days Invn Held 68.43 59.60 45.06 32.93
Invn/Cur. Asset 46.21 43.70 41.61 23.70
Invn Turnover 5.26 6.04 7.99 10.93
PowerGen also showed the same problem that the National Power had. Because the
contract price of the coal from the British Coal is too high and the thermal efficiency of
some of its coal-fired power stations is too low, it is not worth utilizing the stock coal.
Therefore, the days of inventory are increased over time. In the end of 1993, PowerGen
had 15.5 million tons of coal held at power stations and continental ports.95
In order to compete in the electricity generation market, PowerGen needed to find a way
to reduce its operating cost. It adapts the same strategy used by the National Power.
First, it closed old and inefficiency power stations. Since 1991, there were many power
stations closing that total capacity amount about 1900MW of generation capacity
94 Main Prospectus: National Power, PowerGen - The Generating Companies Share Offers, p. 159.
95 PowerGen plc Report and Accounts 1993, p. 6.
88
withdrawn from the market.9 6 As a result, the demand of coal is decreased in the same
time.
After PowerGen decided to close many stations, it found that the staffing level for an
economical operation of the company is too high. Therefore, the company dramatically
reduced its work force. Since 1991, PowerGen has reduced its staffing size by more than
a half of the original level in 1991. More than four thousand workers had been laid off by
the end of 1993.97 The productivity increases by more than 50%. In 1990, the output per
employee is 8. 1GWh. In 1993, the output per employee is 12.9 GWh. 98
Table B2. Employee Information of PowerGen.
Employee information 1993 1992 1991 1990
m m m m
Wages and salaries 141 166 171 166.7
Social security costs 12 14 13.7 12.9
Other pension costs 11 25 25.2 20.2
Total 164 205 209.9 199.8
Operating costs 2455 2739 2677 2384
Ratio 6.68% 7.48% 7.84% 8.38%
The percentage of the employees' remuneration in the total operating cost decreases each
year. Apparently, PowerGen's staffing level like the National Power's was too high
before the vesting. After it is privatized, it started to reduce the staff and closed inefficient
power plants.
PowerGen also used the same strategy to divert the risk of its income. In 1994, "Over
60% of the output was sold to the RECs for onward supply to customers in the franchise
market (sales to retail, small commercial and domestic customers)." 99 'The remaining
output was sold under contracts to direct sales customers or to the RECs for their sales to
larger customers, and in the Electricity Pool."' ° ° This was a strategic move to lower the
risk of business operation. However, the great benefit of market competition is dimmed
9 6 Data from PowerGen plc Report and Accounts 1991, 1992, 1993.
97 Data from PowerGen plc Report and Accounts 1991, 1992, 1993.
98 PowerGen plc Report and Accounts 1993, p. 9.
99 PowerGen plc Annual Review 1994, p. 6.
'° Ibid.
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by these companies' reaction. Nevertheless, it became the largest single supplier to large
industrial and commercial customers in the competitive non-franchise market in 1993.' °'
It also has a contract with EDF to cover the winter peak load demand in France.
CCGT technology was on the top of PowerGen's management team, too. PowerGen built
one 900MW CCGT plant at Killingholme and a 700MW power station at Rye House. A
1400MW power station at Connah's Quay was in construction in 1994. °102 Furthermore,
PowerGen invested in a gas company called Kinetica Limited, jointly owned with Conoco
UK Ltd, that market gas downstream and constructs gas transport pipelines. 10 3 Not only
does the investment decision secure the gas source for PowerGen, but it also contributes
£8m as PowerGen's profit before tax in 1994.
Meanwhile, PowerGen seems to have limited capacity to participate in a cogeneration
project. In 1994, it only has a 14MW cogeneration plant for SmithKline. 10 4 However, it
reorganized its division from a plant builder to a technology provider. The division,
PowerGen CHP Ltd, provides consultants in both THE UK and abroad for technical
advises. 0 5
International business is a new avenue for PowerGen's management. They particularly
focus on the European market. It has a joint venture with Portugal and Germany. The
total capacity of the joint venture amounts to over 2000MW.10 6 Because the company has
its own consulting division, it has a greater flexibility to participate many international
projects without building power plants.
PowerGen invests a certain amount of capital in renewable energy. It built a 600kW
hydroelectric station in North Wales and a 1125kW wind power scheme at Haverigg. It
also participated in building a 7.2MW wind farm with Tomen UK at Rhyd-y-Groes. 10 7
101 PowerGen plc Report and Accounts 1993, p. 6.
10 2 PowerGen plc Annual Review 1994, p. 7.
103 PowerGen plc Annual Review 1994, p. 10.
104 Ibid.
1o5 Ibid.
106 PowerGen plc Report and Accounts 1993, p. 11.
0 7 Ibid, p. 12.
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PowerGen's financial information also presents a very promising future. Consider EPS
(Earning per share),
Table B3. Earning Per Share of PowerGen plcl08
1994 1993 1992 1991
EPS 0.44 0.365 0.31 0.23
Growth rate 20.55% 17.74% 34.78%
Also the total equity growth rate is
Table B4. Total equity growth of PowerGen plc'0 9
1994 1993 1992 1991
Equity rowth 14.91% 13.99% 13.14%
The operating income growth rate and the net income growth rate are
Table B5. Growth Rate of Operating Income and Net Income of PowerGen plc.n °
1994 1993 1992 1991
Oper Income 477 449 332 267
Growth of Oper Income 6.24% 35.24% 24.34%
Net Income 345 285 242 180
Growth of Net Income 21.05% 17.77% 34.44%
The income growth rate is much higher than the majority of the corporations in the stock
market. Obviously, PowerGen and the National Power have already outperformed most
of the companies in the stock market or exploited the consumers by using their market
power to some extent.
Next, consider the profitability ratios.
108 Data from PowerGen plc Report and Accounts 1993, 1992, 1991, Annual Review 1994.
'
09 WorldScope Global Database, Company Record: PowerGen plc.
'0 Data from PowerGen plc Report and Accounts 1993, 1992, 1991, Annual Review 1994.
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Table B6. Profitability Ratios of PowerGen plc."'
1994 1993 1992 1991
Net Inc Margin 11.77 8.94 8.04 5.44
Oper. Inc./Tot. Capital 24.14 27.43 21.96 16.56
Return on Inv. 18.76 18.78 15.00 9.87
Return on Equity 20.66 19.45 18.69 9.72
Return on Assets 11.62 10.44 9.19 6.48
The Net Income Margin indicator shows that PowerGen has a similar performance as the
major U.S. investor-owned electric utilities do. However, the return on equity and asset
indicators have a much higher value compared to the value of the major U.S. investor-
owned electric utilities. This shows that the management of PowerGen performs better to
utilize the company's capital and assets. Meanwhile, the net income margin ratio is close
to the composite value of major U.S. investor-owned electric utilities.
The total asset turnover rate of PowerGen is higher than it of major U.S. investor-owned
electric utilities.
Table B7. Total Asset Turnover Rate of PowerGen plc.u12
1994 1993 1992 1991
Total Asset Turnover 0.84 1.01 0.99 0.95
The same situation happens to the National Power. It seems that both companies
dramatically phased out inefficient machinery that can be sold in the market. It is
interesting that OFFER asked both companies to sell their power plants to independent
investors in order to increase the competition in the market, but both companies claimed
that they could not find any suitable to buy those outdated power plants.
The leverage ratio of PowerGen shows more apparent unbalance between debt and equity.
Il' WorldScope Global Database, Company Record: PowerGen plc.
112 WorldScope Global Database, Company Record: PowerGen plc.
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Table B8. Leverage Ratios of PowerGen plc.113
1994 1993 1992 1991
Total Debt%Total Capital 17.99 14.27 13.31 24.27
PFD stock%total capital 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Debt%total asset 12.02 8.84 7.40 14.86
LT debt% total capital 11.61 13.29 9.90 11.42
Equity%total capital 88.39 86.71 90.10 88.58
COM EQTY%total asset 54.78 53.10 48.21 46.37
There is a possibility that both PowerGen and the National Power have a different
philosophy on the management of a corporation. On the other hand, it is possible that the
tax code in the U.S. favors corporation borrowing that results in the high leverage ratios
of the major U.S. investor-owned electric utilities. Nevertheless, PowerGen has a low
debt level and the investors do not have to worry if PowerGen is in financial distress.
When we check the liquidity ratios of PowerGen' 14, we found that the values of these
indicators show a similar value to the composite indicators of the major U.S. investor-
owned electric utilities.
Table B9. Liquidity Ratios of PowerGen plc.
1994 1993 1992 1991
Current ratio 1.00 1.35 1.04 1.08
Quick ratio 0.52 0.70 0.53 0.79
In that case, the management of PowerGen adapts a similar practice like the practice of
the major U.S. utilities. The cash flowing inside the company is suitable to an electricity
company's operation.
PowerGen's performance demonstrated more characteristics similar to that of the major
U.S. investor-owned electric utilities. However, the growth of PowerGen still energized
the growth of its stock value. In March 1994, the P/E ratio of PowerGen is 11.97.115 This
value is very close to the National Power's value. The market-to-book ratio is 2.15.'16 It
13 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
"5 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
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means a 115% growth of stock value since its privatization. This means that the British
government may undervalue the issues of both companies before its privatization. On the
other hand, the beta of PowerGen is 0.97 that is lower than 1.' l 7 The risk of PowerGen's
stock is lower than most of the companies in the stock market. Normally, an electricity
company has a lower beta value due to its business characteristics. we can say the stock
performance of PowerGen is normal but the stock performance of the National Power is
exceptional.
Still, consumers and OFFER suspect that PowerGen exploited the consumers unduly.
OFFER and PowerGen calculated the ROCE for proving their points respectively.
Table B10. Return on Capital Employed (ROCE), PowerGen"8
Figure in Cn OFFER's PowerGen's Calculations**
Calculation*
1992 1993 1992 1993
Net Capital 1105.5 1182.5 1731 1818
Employed*
Profits Before 326 452 326 452
Interest &
Tax
ROCE % 29.5 38.2 18.8 24.9
* Group, excluding assets in course of construction
** Group, including assets in course of construction
Apparently, PowerGen has a greater ROCE ratio than it of National Power and the
majority companies in the stock market. It is difficult for PowerGen to explain the ROCE
value to the regulator even though PowerGen's profitability ratios are close to that of the
major U.S. investor-owned electric utilities. There is a possible explanation that
PowerGen has a higher ROCE value. Because PowerGen is the largest electricity supplier
for franchise market and has certain amount of contracts with RECs, it has more fixed
priced sale with the its buyers. Therefore, the pool bidding mechanism affects PowerGen
less than it affects National Power. PowerGen's management enthusiastically located
'17 Ibid.
118 OFFER, "Decision On A Monopolies And Mergers Commission Reference, February 1994."
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electricity buyers to divert the operational risk. However, the intention of the market
competition is lost because PowerGen has a higher degree of freedom to operate. we will
discuss OFFER's point in the end of the following section.
95
Financial Highlights 1991 1992 1993 1994
Turnover m 2651 3097 3188 2932
Profit before tax m 272 359 425 476
Earning per share pence 23 31 36.5 44
Dividends per share pence 8.32 9.25 10.5 12.65
Annualized dividend cover times 2.9 3.4 3.5 3.5
Shareholders' funds m 1295 1465 1670 1919
Consolidated Profit and Loss Account
Turnover- continuing activities
Operating costs
Operating profit - continuing activities
Exceptional items
Income from interests in associated
undertakings
Profit on ordinary activities before
interest
Net interest payable
Profit on ordinary activities before
taxation
Tax on profit on ordinary activities
Profit on ordinary activities after
taxation
Extraordinary items
Profit/(Loss) for the year
Dividends
Retained profit/(loss) for the year
1994 1993 1992
m m m
2932 3188 3009
-2455 -2739 -2677
477 449 332
-6
1991
m
2651
-2384
267
-26
8 3
485 452 326 241
-9 -27
476 425
33
359
31
272
-131 -140 -117 -92
345 285 242 180
-54
242 126
-99 -82 -72 -43
246 203 170 83
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Balance sh et Growl- 
Fixed assets
Tangible assets
Fuel security stocks
Investments
Subtotal
Current assets
Stocks
Debtors: amounts falling due after more than
one year
Debtors: amounts falling due within one year
Short term deposits
Subtotal
Creditors: amounts falling due within one year
Bank overdraft
Other
Net current assets
Total assets less current liabilities
Creditors: amounts falling due
after more than one year
Provisions for liabilities and charges
Subtotal
Capital and reserves
Called up share capital
Share premium account
Capital reserve
Profit and loss account
Total
End date
1993
m
1814
129
162
2106
454
70
319
266
1109
-16
-755
338
2444
-475
-299
1670
391
2
474
803
1670
4-Apr-
93
1992 1991 1990
m m m
1735
129
132
1996
387
112
310
234
1043
-58
-832
153
2149
-325
-359
1465
391
474
600
1465
29-
Mar-93
1448
174
79
1701
1362.9
173.8
64.2
1600.9
237 169.8
385 530.5
470 70.1
1092 770.4
-104
-820
168
1869
-300
-274
1295
-51.8
-406.2
312.4
1913.3
-204.2
-226.5
1482.6
391
474
430
1295
474
430
1295
31-
Mar-91
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Balance sheet Group
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